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Abstract
This Article is intended to describe the constitutional impact of the 1995 enlargement upon
the European Union. The first section situates the 1995 enlargement in its historical context. The
second section sets forth the institutional changes produced by the 1994 Act of Accession and side
arrangements. Next, the Article analyzes the principle of the acquis communautaire. A fourth
section describes the steps in the procedure leading to the enlargement. A final section is more
speculative in character, reviewing the prospects of likely candidates for accession in the future
and raising some of the institutional issues further enlargement would pose for the Union.
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INTRODUCTION
At Corfu on June 24, 1994, the Treaties and Final Acts were
signed to enable Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden to join
the European Union.1 The people of Austria, Finland and Swe-
den endorsed in referenda the decision of their governments to
become Member States (or "States") of the Union, but unfortu-
nately the Norwegian referendum proved adverse. Accordingly,
on January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden increased the
European Union membership to fifteen States, instead of the
"sweet sixteen" that had been popularly hoped for.
Thus occurred, in the words of the European Council
2
1. E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 86 (1994). For an analysis of the procedure, especially the
negotiations leading to the accession of these States, see Dierk Booss &John Forman,
Enlargement: Legal and Procedural Aspects, 32 COMMON MKT. L. Rav. 95 (1995).
2. The European Council is composed of the Heads of State and Government of
each of the Member States, together with the President of the Commission. In 1969, an
initial summit meeting of these leaders at the Hague proved so successful that the meet-
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meeting at Corfu, "an important new landmark in the history of
European integration."' The European Council welcomed the
new States' participation in "a European Union faced with rapid
development after the entry into force of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union."4 Particularly appreciated was "the additional im-
petus coming from [the new States] which are in the vanguard
of the efforts to promote environmental and social protection,
transparency and open government."5
The initial European Economic Community, created by the
Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957,6 consisted of six states:
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands. Although invited, the United Kingdom chose not to join
the new venture. Since the 1970's, the political dynamism and
economic success of the Community, formally restructured as
the European Union in 1993 by the Treaty of Maastricht, 7 has
incited its bordering nations to seek to join the club.
In three "enlargements," the Community (now the Union)
has added each time three new Member States, each enlarge-
ment marking a new stage of constitutional, political and eco-
nomic growth quite visible in a historical perspective, rather like
ings became a regular feature of the Community, occurring two or three times a year.
The European Council formally became an organic part of the European Community
structure through Title I, Article 2 of the Single European Act. Single European Act,
art. 2, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA] (amending Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987)).
3. E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 8 (1994).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. EEC Treaty, supra note 2. Technically, the proper term is the European Com-
munities, comprising also the institutional structure and scope of the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 167, as
amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off.
1987), and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167, as amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987). Our attention in this Article is focused, however, on the
European Economic Community, commonly called the European Community, or sim-
ply the Community.
7. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU] (amending EEC Treaty, supra note 2).
This Treaty is sometimes called the TEU, but more often the Maastricht Treaty after its
signature site. Signed on February 7, 1992, the Maastricht Treaty came into effect on
November 1, 1993. The changes to the EEC Treaty, supra note 1, made by the TEU,
supra, were incorporated into the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7,
1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
1 EUROPEAN UNION GROWS
the successive rings in the growth of a tree. In the first enlarge-
ment in 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in-
creased the number of Member States by 50%, with a compara-
bly large augmentation of the Community's political authority,
economic force and scope of practical operations. The second
"Mediterranean enlargement," adding Greece in 1981 and Por-
tugal and Spain in 1986, a one-third increase in numbers, did
not have quite so large an impact, but nonetheless contributed
substantially to the Community's continuing success.
In the current enlargement, which we will call the "1995 en-
largement" to distinguish it from the prior ones, the political au-
thority and economic scope of the European Union has in-
creased once again, although naturally not to the same degree as
in the earlier accessions. The addition of Austria, Finland and
Sweden represents only a 25% increase in Member States. (If
Norway had decided to join, this would have meant a one-third
increase.) The Union population has grown by 6.2%, from 349
to 370 million, and the Gross Domestic Production has in-
creased by about 7%.8 Only the land area of the Union has ex-
panded significantly, by about one-third, due to the enormous
sparsely-populated northern region of Finland and Sweden -
an interesting but hardly very important factor.
Ever since the first enlargement, all accessions of new States
have been governed by a basic principle, the "acquis com-
munautaire." This French term has become, as we shall see, a
vital concept of Community, and now Union, law: it figures as a
fundamental principle in Article B of the Maastricht Treaty,
which describes as one of the Union objectives: "to maintain in
full the acquis communautaire and build on it."9 The term is
quite difficult to translate into English. "Acquis com-
munautaire" essentially conveys the idea that the institutional
structure, scope, policies and rules of the Community (now
Union) are to be treated as "given" ("acquis"), not to be called
into question or substantially modified by new States at the time
they enter.
The acquis communautaire concept entered Community
law when Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in
8. The European Union: Now Fifteen, EC OFF. PRESS & PUB. An-. PRESS RELEASE (Jan.
10, 1995).
9. TEU, supra note 7, art. A.
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the first enlargement. After the Hague Summit of Heads of
State and Government on December 1-2, 1969 endorsed the
concept,' ° the acquis communautaire principle became the basis
of the accession negotiations. The 1972 Act of Accession spelled
out the new states' acceptance of the original Treaties, the legis-
lative acts and the declarations or resolutions of the Council,
and any international agreements or conventions entered into at
that time.' The acquis communautaire principle also governed
the negotiations with Greece, Portugal and Spain in the Mediter-
ranean enlargement, and the respective Acts of Accession repli-
cate the terms of the 1972 Act.12
In its 1992 Report, "Europe and the Challenge of Enlarge-
ment," 3 meant to cover both the 1995 enlargement and any fu-
ture ones, the Commission significantly expanded the sense of
the acquis communautaire. The Commission described it as en-
compassing "the contents, principles and political objectives of
the Treaties, including the Maastricht Treaty."' 4 The Commis-
sion stressed that this now included acceptance of the Economic
and Monetary Union and the Common Foreign and Security
Policy,' 5 both vital (but hardly non-controversial) features of the
Maastricht Treaty. The Commission also included "the jurispru-
dence of the Court"16 in tandem with legislation, declarations,
resolution and international agreements' to date. The Commis-
sion's broader approach to the acquis communautaire was, as we
shall see, accepted in the negotiations and figures in the terms
of the 1994 Act of Accession.
10. Final Communiqu6 of the Conference of Heads of State or Government on 1
and 2 December 1969 at the Hague, in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
THIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITIES 1969, at 489, 13
(1970) [hereinafter THIRD REPORT]. The annual reports of the Commission to the Par-
liament are mandated by Article 156 of the EC Treaty. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 156
("The Commission shall publish annually, not later than one month before the open-
ing of the session of the European Parliament, a general report on the activities of the
Community.").
11. 1972 Act of Accession, arts. 2-5,J.O. L 73/1, at 14-15 (1972).
12. Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Hellenic Republic and the
Adjustments to the Treaties, arts. 2-5, 6.J. L 291/17, at 17-18 (1979) [hereinafter Act of
Accession for Greece]; Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of
Spain and the Portuguese Republic and the Adjustments to the Treaties, arts. 2-5, OJ. L
302/23, at 23-24 (1985) [hereinafter Act of Accession for Spain and Portugal].
13. E.C. BULL., no. 3, supp. (1992) [hereinafter Challenge of Enlargement].
14. Id. at 12.
15. Id. at 11-12.
16. Id. at 12.
EUROPEAN UNION GROWS
Considering that the 1995 enlargement represents a lesser
increase in Member States, as well as population and economic
capacity, than the earlier enlargements, one might be tempted
to consider it to be of only moderate importance. It could be
argued that, because the new States did accept all the elements
of the acquis communautaire, their addition to the Union
merely constitutes "more of the same."
That is definitely not the case. The 1995 enlargement, just
as the earlier ones, has already profoundly marked the history of
the European Union. The accession of Austria, Finland and
Sweden is bound to influence significantly the future evolution
of the European Union, its policies and its political character.
Each new State will add its own particular contribution to the
total Union structure and to the resolution of the internal de-
bates over its future that will occur during the next intergovern-
mental conference, scheduled for 1996.17
This Article is intended to describe :the constitutional im-
pact of the 1995 enlargement upon'the European Union. The
first section situates the 1995 enlargement in its historical con-
text. (Readers already familiar with this context may wish to
move rapidly to the later, more'analytical sections.) The second
section sets forth the institutional changes produced by the 1994
Act of Accession and side arrangements. Next, the Article ana-
lyzes the principle of the acquis communautaire. A fourth sec-
tion describes the steps in the procedure leading to the enlarge-
ment. A final section is more speculative in character, reviewing
the prospects of likely candidates for accession in the future and
raising some of the institutional issues further enlargement
would pose for the Union.
I. THE 1995 ENLARGEMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTVE
A. Priority Attention to the Unification of Germany
When Austria submitted its formal application for accession
on July 17, 1989,18 the European Community was not yet ready
to give serious consideration to its request. The Soviet Union,
then led by President Gorbachev, was still concerned with the
17. TEU, supra note 7, art. N. Article N of the Maastricht Treaty mandates the
convening in 1996 of an intergovernmental conference to consider further amend-
ments to the Treaty. Id.
18. 22 E.C. BULL., no. 7/8, at 70 (1989).
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balance of power in Central Europe, so that Austria's need to
take a neutralist posture in international affairs had not yet
ceased to be a live factor. Although the Council responded fa-
vorably to Austria's interest and authorized the Commission to
begin in July 1989 its mandatory review of the political and eco-
nomic viability of Austria's request, matters were bound to pro-
ceed slowly.
Indeed, in 1990 the attention of the Community was cen-
tered on a far more imperative issue: how to facilitate the unifi-
cation of Germany. Events moved rapidly that year. By early
1990, as the East German government's control was crumbling,
and the Soviet Union in a spirit of detente (and manifestly in
return for Western financial aid) no longer was barring the way,
Chancellor Kohl and the West German government were fever-
ishly preparing the political and economic measures to attain
unification.
On April 28, 1990, an extraordinary meeting of the Euro-
pean Council in Dublin took a critical step by declaring its
strong support for the West German initiatives,19 at a time when
some political figures and media leaders were unconvinced of
the need for speed (and perhaps somewhat concerned over the
power potential of a united Germany). In addition to its moral
support, the European Council unanimously "agreed that, sub-
ject to the necessary transitional provisions, the integration of
the territory of the German Democratic Republic would take ef-
fect without any revision of the Treaties."20 German unification
would thus take place "under a European roof."21
The European Council accepted the West German ap-
proach of integration of the five East German LS.nder into the
Federal Republic structure. The unification was accordingly
treated largely as an internal German affair, instead of as a quasi-
accession procedure. Within the Community's own institutional
structure, neither the Commission, Council, Parliament nor
Court of Justice was to be modified. This was somewhat surpris-
ing. Although Germany's population grew by seventeen million
through the unification, and its economic power also signifi-
19. 23 E.C. BULL., no. 4, at 8 (1990).
20. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XX1VTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE
AcrMITIEs OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1990, at 37, 17 (1991) [hereinafter
TWENrY-FOURTH REPORT].
21. 23 E.C. BULL., no. 4, at 8 (1990).
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cantly increased, so that it became for the first time clearly a
larger State than France, Italy and the United Kingdom, neither
its weighted vote in the Council nor its number of members of
Parliament increased. Recently, the December 1992 Edinburgh
European Council authorized an increase in Parliament's total
size,2 2 formally carried out in time for the June 1994 parliamen-
tary elections by Council Decision 93/81,23 so that Germany now
has ninety-nine MEPs, twelve more than the eighty-seven each
allotted to France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Germany,
however, has never asked for a larger weighted vote in the Coun-
cil than the ten votes that it has traditionally been allocated, the
same number as France, Italy and the United Kingdom.
Thus, after a frenzied summer of preparation, the unifica-
tion of Germany occurred on October 3, 1990, facilitated to
some degree by a series of transitional regulations adopted by
the Community institutions to enable the phase-in of Commu-
nity agricultural, internal market and environmental rules in
East Germany. 4 Moreover, in 1989-91, the Soviet Union be-
came increasingly preoccupied with its own domestic economic
problems, reinforcing its policy of dftente. This led to the rapid
transformation of central Europe, as one Marxist regime after
another toppled, to be replaced by more or less democratic, free
market-oriented governments.
B. The Internal Market Program: Magnet for the Applicant States
It was, then, in this global political context that Sweden filed
its formal accession application on July 1, 1991,25 and that Fin-
land followed suit on March 18, 1992.26 Norway's application
came a bit later, on November 25, 1992.27 Although Norway had
always been an active member of NATO, Finland and Sweden,
like Austria, had traditionally followed a neutralist foreign pol-
icy. Prior to the fatal weakening of the Soviet Union and the
22. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 12 (1992).
23. OJ. L 33/15 (1993).
24. TWENTY-FOURTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 37-41, 11 17-25 (1991).
25. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE
Acrvrrims OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1991, at 267, 1 849 (1992) [hereinafter
TWENTY-DFTH REPORT].
26. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVITH GENERAL REPORT ON THE
ACIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1992, at 269, 749 (1993) [hereinafter
TWENT-SIXTH REPORT].
27. Id. at 270, 797.
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total collapse of Marxism in central Europe, Austria, Finland and
Sweden could never have seriously entertained the idea of join-
ing such a fundamentally western bloc as the European Commu-
nity - nor, doubtlessly, could the Community have seriously
considered taking the risk of Soviet displeasure by allowing
either Austria or Finland to join.
What was the magnet that drew the four applicants? That is
quite clear. The desire to form part of a larger supra-sovereign
body that might perhaps provide a certain security shelter was
never the fundamental motivating force (although this partially
influenced Finland, constantly wary of its powerful Russian
neighbor). No, the magnet was the economic success of the Eu-
ropean Community, in particular the widely perceived value of
becoming a part of the integrated internal market.
To look back a bit in time, the early 1980's in the European
Community were not a particularly happy or optimistic period.
Frequent strife between the Council and the Parliament over
budgetary and institutional issues, bitter conflicts over finances
and the agricultural policy at the level of the Council and of the
European Council itself, and a sense that national barriers to in-
tra-EC trade were multiplying, rather than diminishing, all con-
tributed to what was frequently characterized as "Europessim-
ism" or "Eurostagnation." 8
The European Council meeting at Dublin in December
1984, 29 concerned by this state of affairs, decided that the Com-
munity "should take steps to complete the Internal Market." By
a fortunate coincidence in timing, a new Commission took office
in 1985, led by the dynamic, far-sighted and politically adroit
President Jacques Delors. Working in close collaboration with
another politically astute commissioner in charge of internal af-
fairs, Lord Cockfield, and supported by the entire Commission,
they produced the famous 1985 White Paper on Completing the
Internal Market, ° at the specific request of the European Coun-
28. GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, ELEANOR M. Fox,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 10 (1993).
29. 17 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 17 (1984).
30. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 Final
(June 1985); cf. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINETEENTH GENERAL RE-
PORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 1985, at 89-90, 162-65 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter NINETEENTH REPORT].
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cil. 1 The White Paper proved an almost instant success, secur-
ing the immediate backing of the Milan European Council in
June 1985, which instructed the Council to act upon the Com-
mission White Paper proposals.3 2 Thereafter, the White Paper
program captured the imagination first of industrial and finan-
cial leaders, then the media, and ultimately the public at large.
The White Paper has proved to be an extraordinarily pre-
cise and persuasive program for legislative action. It contained a
list of 279 proposals for legislation, together with a time-table for
action. Within less than seven years, by the target date of De-
cember 31, 1992 set in the White Paper, over 95% of the com-
plex legislative program to complete the internal market had
been adopted by the Community institutions," and the Member
States were well along in the process of enacting implementing
measures. The internal market program has not ceased either;
there are on-going efforts to adopt new measures seen as desira-
ble ancillary or "flanking" supplements to the key ones. 4
C. The Single European Act: First Stage on the Road to Union
Equally significant, the internal market program became in-
extricably linked with the Community's evolution toward greater
political and constitutional union. It would take too long to
trace here the developmental threads of the late 1970's and early
1980's, but the definite historical landmark from which the
Community has moved forward is the Solemn Declaration on
European Union 5 adopted by the European Council at Stutt-
gart in June 1983. This declaration affirms the desire "to achieve
a comprehensive and coherent common political approach" to
the goal of European Union. 6
The first constitutional fruit of the Solemn Declaration was
31. The European Council meeting at Brussels in March 29-30, 1985 called upon
the Commission to draw up a detailed program with a specific timetable to achieve a
single large market by 1992. 18 E.C. BULL., no. 3, at 12 (1985).
32. 18 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 14-15 (1985).
33. XXVI REPORT, supra note 26, at 35, 69.
34. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVIITH GENERAL REPORT ON
THE AcrnwrVs OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1993, at 39, 70 (1994) [hereinafter
TWENY-SEvENTH REPORT].
35. 16 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 24-29 (1983); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES, SEVENTEENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE Ac-'ITIFEs OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
1983, at 17, general survey (1984) [hereinafter SEVENTEENTH REPORT].
36. 16 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 24 (1983).
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the 1987 Single European Act3 7 ("SEA"), which made a number
of major changes in the institutional structure and sphere of op-
erations of the Community. Most relevant here are the en-
hanced role of Parliament in the legislative process, the facilita-
tion of harmonized legislation to achieve the internal market by
permitting the Council of Ministers to act by a qualified majority
vote, and the setting of the target date of December 31, 1992, to
achieve the internal market, defined as "an area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services
and capital is ensured."38
In operation, the Single European Act has proved itself to
be an almost unqualified success. It is true that initially Parlia-
ment was not happy with the SEA, which many members re-
garded as only a half-way house on the road to Parliament's
more far-reaching aspirations, and serious criticisms of the com-
promises embodied in the SEA were voiced by authoritative com-
mentators.39 But the record of operations in applying the SEA's
various institutional modifications has been extraordinarily suc-
cessful. Setting the internal market goal in Article 8a undoubt-
edly gave it greater political force (whatever its legal effect may
be) .'0 The larger legislative role accorded to Parliament in the
37. SEA, supra note 2.
38. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 8a, added by SEA, supra note 2, art. 13. The
Maastricht Treaty has (confusingly) renumbered this well-known article as 7a.
39. The most weighty criticism of the SEA came from Judge Pierre Pescatore, a
leading constitutional scholar and influential member of the Court ofJustice from 1966
to 1984. Pierre Pescatore, Some Critical Remarks on the "Single European Act", 24 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 9 (1987); see Nicholas Forwood & Mark Clough, The Single European Act and
Free Movement, 11 EUR. L. REv. 383 (1986). For analytical but favorable analyses of the
SEA, see George Bermann, The Single European Act: A New Constitution for the Commu-
nity?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (1989); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The Internal
Market Following the Single European Act, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 361 (1987); Hans
Joachim Glaesner, The Single European Act: Attempt at an Appraisal, 10 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 446 (1986-87).
40. A Declaration on Article 8a of the EEC Treaty was annexed to the SEA by the
Luxembourg Intergovernmental Conference that prepared it. The Declaration affirms
the "firm political will" of the Member States to implement the Commission White Pa-
per, but disclaims any "automatic legal effect" for Article 8a. This has occasioned an
important debate, Messrs. Ehlermann and Glaesner in their articles, supra note 39, ar-
gue that Article 8a can give rise to an action for enforcement by an institution or Mem-
ber State, even if it has no direct effect as such. Professor A.G. Toth, however, main-
tains that the Declaration in no way binds the Court ofJustice, which may well find that
Article 8a has direct legal effect. A.G. Toth, The Legal Status of the Declarations Annexed to
the Single European Act, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 803 (1986). Interestingly, Parliament
has recently sued the Commission under EC Treaty Article 175 because of its alleged
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cooperation process has not produced delay and deadlock, but
rather definite signs of improved drafting and a better end prod-
UCt.
4 1
Consequently, when at the start of the 1990's, Austria, Fin-
land, Norway and Sweden began to solicit closer ties with the
European Community, they were not only attracted by the suc-
cess of the internal market program, but also reasonably per-
ceived the institutional and constitutional structure of the Com-
munity to be functional and effective.
D. The European Economic Area: Half-Way House to Accession
All four applicant States, along with Iceland, Switzerland
and Liechtenstein (linked in a customs union with Switzerland),
had long been associated in the European Free Trade Associa-
tion. The EFTA Stockholm Agreement4" was originally entered
into in 1960 as a trade bloc counter-weight to then young Euro-
pean Community. Indeed, the United Kingdom, which later
joined the Community in the first enlargement in 1973, was ini-
tially the leading nation in EFTA. Denmark and Portugal also
belonged to EFTA before joining the Community.
Throughout its history, EFTA has only been a free-trade
bloc, quite successful in trade liberalization among its members,
but never aspiring to the sort of institutional supra-national char-
acter that the Community has developed. The Community and
EFTA, after some early difficulties (giving rise to the famous
phrase, "Europe at sixes and sevens," playing upon the fact that
the Community initially consisted of six and EFTA of seven
states), have always enjoyed close trade relations. These were in-
tensified by new agreements for free trade in industrial products
after Denmark and the United Kingdom joined the Commu-
nity.43
failure to produce legislative proposals to achieve the free movement of persons under
Article 8a, and the case is currently pending in the Court of Justice. Case C-445/93,
O.J. C 1/12 (1994).
41. The Commission affirmed that "the inclusion of Parliament in the decision-
making process has certainly improved the texts." TWENT-FIFTH REPORT, supra note 25,
at 364, 1 1149. In accord are the Commission's comments in TWEN1Y-SIXTH REPORT,
supra note 26, at 372-73, 1088.
42. The text of the EFTA Agreement immediately prior to the European Eco-
nomic Area Agreement is contained in EFTA SECRETARIAT, THE EuROPEAN FREE TRADE
ASSOCIATION 118 (3d ed. 1987).
43. For a description of relations between the Community and EFTA from the
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On April 9, 1984, EC-EFTA relations began a new phase at a
conference in Luxembourg of the foreign ministers of all the
Community Member States and of the EFTA states. The Luxem-
bourg Declaration, proclaimed at the close of the conference,
called for increased cooperation, with joint ministerial meetings
to be held annually, and set a goal: the creation of "a dynamic
European economic space."" Note the timing of the Luxem-
bourg Declaration, which came soon after the 1983 Stuttgart
Declaration on European Union, and shortly before the 1985
White Paper on Completing the Internal Market.
The European Council and the 1985-89 Commission led by
President Delors certainly supported the aspirations of the EFTA
states, but not unnaturally gave precedence to the Community's
own internal market goal and to the modifications of the Single
European Act. It was not until April 28, 1990, that the European
Council in Dublin took the policy decision to authorize move-
ment toward a European Economic Area, as the European eco-
nomic space was renamed.4' Accordingly, on June 18, 1990, the
Council authorized the Commission to commence negotiations
with the EFTA States.46 (Note, in terms of timing, that the ar-
rangements for German unification in the fall of 1990 had to
take priority.)
Negotiations were long and arduous, throughout all of
1991. Towards their conclusion, the Commission submitted the
initial draft European Economic Area ("EEA") Agreement for
prior review to the Court of Justice, giving rise to the famous
EEA Opinion 1/91,"7 in which the Court required amendments
to the proposed arrangements in order to insure the primacy of
its own precedents, and affirmed its view that the European Eco-
nomic Community Treaty "constitutes the constitutional charter
of a Community based on the rule of law."48 After rapid revi-
sions in early 1992 to meet the Court's objections,4 9 the EEA
1960's to the 1980's, see E.P.M. Gardener, The European Free Trade Association and the
European Community, 25 IrNr'L LAw. 187 (1991).
44. 17 E.C. BULL., no. 4, at 9-10 (1984).
45. 23 E.G. BULL., no. 4, at 8-9 (1990).
46. 23 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 94 (1990); TWENT-FOURTH REPORT, supra note 20, at
273-74, 1 688 (1991).
47. European Economic Area, Opinion 1/91, [1991] E.C.R. -' [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
245 (Eur. Ct.J. Dec. 14, 1991).
48. Id. at -, 21, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 269.
49. The Court ofJustice gave a favorable opinion on the modifications to the EEA
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Agreement was signed on May 2, 1992, in Oporto, Portugal.5 °
The European Parliament gave its assent, as required by EEC
Treaty Article 238 after the Single European Act, on October 28,
1992.51
A disconcerting surprise occurred during the ratification
process. The Swiss referendum of December 6, 1992, resulted in
a narrow negative majority of 50.3%.52 Switzerland accordingly
could not participate in the EEA Agreement. (Indeed, Switzer-
land had also filed an application for accession on May 20,
199253 which was naturally side-tracked by the referendum.)
Switzerland's failure to ratify the EEA Agreement required the
parties to draft quickly a Protocol to make modifications in the
financial and institutional provisions of the Agreement, which
necessarily delayed its entry into force.' The process of ratifica-
tion by all the other EFTA states and the Community Member
States took most of 1993.
The EEA Agreement accordingly came into force on Janu-
ary 1, 1994.55 Its economic importance for the Community, and
even more for the EFTA states, cannot be overestimated. In
1990, the Community was EFTA's main trading partner, taking
about 58% of all EFTA exports and providing over 61% of the
imports of the EFTA states. EFTA was also the Community's
main trading partner, providing the Community in 1990 with
Agreement in Opinion 1/92, [1992] E.C.R. 2821, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 217 (Eur. Ct. J.
Apr. 10, 1992).
50. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 5, at 77-78 (1992); cf. TWENTY-SIXTH REPORT, supra note 26,
at 267-68, 1 789 (1993), which also provides a succinct summary of the principal EEA
Agreement provisions. The EEA Agreement appears at O.J. L 1/1 (1992). For a conve-
nient source for the principal text, see The EEA Treaty: Main Agreement and Selected Proto-
cols, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1247 (1992). For a description of the EEA Agreement,
see Sven Norberg, The Agreement on a European Economic Area, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
1171 (1992); Armando Toledano Laredo, The EEA Agreement: An Overall View, 29 COM-
MON MKT. L. REv. 1199 (1992).
51. TwEiqrr-SIXTH REPORT, supra note 26, at 267, 789 (1993).
52. Alan Riding, Swiss Reject Tie to Wider Europe, N.Y. TIM-S, Dec. 7, 1992, at A7. In
the almost dead-heat vote, the German-speaking cantons provided the margin for de-
feat. The principal motives for the adverse vote appeared to be a fear of large-scale
immigration, concern for the Alpine environmental protection rules, and a desire to
retain the traditional cantonal form of democracy.
53. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 5, at 78 (1992).
54. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 122 (1992); TwEN1Y-SixTH REPORT, supra note 26, at
267, 1 789. The Protocol was signed on March 17, 1993. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 3, at 57
(1993).
55. E.U. BULL., no. 1/2, at 69-70 (1994).
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23% of its imports (compared with 18% from the United States
and 11% from Japan), and taking 26.5% of the Community's
exports (compared with 18% to the United States and 5% to
Japan) 56
At the time of the signing of the EEA Agreement in Oporto,
a press release described the EEA as "the largest and most im-
portant integrated economic area in the world" and called it "a
particularly important element in the new architecture of Eu-
rope."57 Both are accurate statements. In essential terms, the
extremely complicated EEA Agreement constitutes the absorp-
tion of the EFTA states (other than Switzerland) into the Com-
munity's internal market. On EFTA's side, the states must align
their rules to those of the Community, without any derogation
or deviation except as permitted by the Agreement. The EFTA
states agreed to adopt over 1500 separate legal measures, an-
nexed to the EEA Agreement. Sven Norberg, the Director for
Legal Affairs of the EFTA Secretariat, has pithily described the
result as "a common European legal system."58
Attaining a single integrated internal market means the
elimination of barriers to the free movement of goods, workers,
services, and capital, with the concomitant right of establish-
ment. With limited exceptions, the EEA Agreement obligates
the Community and the EFTA states to remove such barriers
among themselves.59 Moreover, outside of the internal market
program itself, the EFTA nations agreed to accept most of the
Community's legislation in the areas of consumer rights, envi-
ronmental protection, and social policy (employee rights).6 Fi-
nally, the EFTA states had to adopt a system of competition
rules, together with administrative and judicial enforcement of
those rules, which essentially parallels the Community competi-
tion law.61
The EEA Agreement thus represented a program for legisla-
tive action by the EFTA states even more ambitious than that
56. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 5, at 13-14 (1992).
57. European Economic Area, 25 E.C. BuLL., no. 5, at 130 (1992) [hereinafter Press
Release] (containing press release issued following creation of European Economic
Area).
58. Norberg, supra note 50, at 1172.
59. For a summary, see Press Release, supra note 57, at 130-33. For articles describ-
ing the EEA Agreement, see supra note 50.
60. Press Release, supra note 57, at 131.
61. Id.
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assumed by the Community in 1987 when it committed itself to
attaining a completed internal market by the end of 1992. This
is because the Community had already in place a substantial
body of harmonized legislation in 1987 to serve as the starting
point, while the EFTA countries had in large measure to begin
the process (unless, like Austria, they had opted in recent years
to adapt some of their legislation to conform with Community
directives).
The institutional structure created by the EEA Agreement,
particularly those elements designed directly for the EFTA states,
is not of direct concern in the present review. It is worth noting,
however, that the EFTA states agreed to contribute substantial
amounts to a Community cohesion fund, which was intended to
help lesser-developed regions of the Community to confront the
challenge posed by the greater competitive pressures of a com-
pleted internal market.62 Because the EFTA states were, gener-
ally speaking, well-advanced industrial and 'commercial econo-
mies, these contributions were required to balance the benefits
they were thought to receive through the integration of their
economies into the Community market.
Under the EEA Agreement itself, the wholesale acceptance
of Community internal market and related legislation was sched-
uled to cover measures adopted through July 31, 1991, a date
close to the end of the negotiation period. This has been up-
dated. By EEAJoint Committee Decision 7/94, the EFTA states
(other than Switzerland) agreed to accept also the pertinent
Community measures adopted between August 1, 1991 and De-
cember 31, 1993, or over two more years of substantial legislative
activity.63
Arguably, the EEA Agreement comes close to making the
EFTA states non-voting members of the Community. Indeed,
the obligation imposed on the EFTA states to align so much of
their legislation with the Community's would seem to be an ac-
ceptable burden only in view of the fact that most of the EFTA
states (Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and even Switzerland)
were applicants for Community membership.
62. Press Release, supra note 57, at 131-32. Over the initial five years of the EEA
Agreement, the EFA nations participating were to contribute 1.5 billion ECU in soft
loans and 500 million ECU in direct grants to the cohesion fund.
63. Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No. 7/94, OJ. L 160/1 (1994); E.U.
BuLL., no. 6, at 87 (1994).
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If Austria, Finland and Sweden had been content to keep
their status as members of the European Economic Area (as
have Iceland, and now Norway), they would already have ac-
cepted a major reduction in their independent decision-making
capacity in the economic sphere in return for their inclusion in
the vastly larger integrated free market economy of the Commu-
nity. But these three States, together with the Norwegian gov-
ernment of Prime Minister Bruntland, wanted more - they
sought full Community membership. However, within the Com-
munity the process of major constitutional revision required that
their applications be held in abeyance.
E. The Ambitious Modifications of the Maastricht Treaty and the
Unpleasant Surprises During Its Ratfication
When Austria applied in July 1989, the Commission, Parlia-
ment, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and most of the other Mem-
ber States were pressing for further steps toward European
union, building on the perceived success of the Single European
Act. In their view, an integrated internal market appeared a
truncated success without the cap of a European Economic and
Monetary Union ("EMU"). The continued stability of the Euro-
pean Monetary System appeared to show that the time was ripe
for further initiatives. At its June 1988 meeting in Hanover, the
European Council "confirmed the objective of progressive reali-
"164PusattthE-
zation of economic and monetary union. Pursuant to the Eu
ropean Council's request, the April 1989 Delors Report,65 au-
thored by the Commission President and representatives of the
central banks of several Member States, outlined the proposed
features of an EMU and set forth concrete stages of action to
attain it.
Moreover, with significant support from the Commission,
Parliament had long sought to gain a greater share in the legisla-
tive process and to obtain other powers to remedy the "demo-
cratic deficit." President Mitterand, Chancellor Kohl, Prime
Minister Gonsalez, Prime Minister Lubbers and other Member
64. 21 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 165 (1988).
65. A summary of the Delors Report is contained in 22 E.C. BULL., no. 4, at 8-9
(1989). The entire Report was published specially by the Commission and is carefully
analyzed inJean-Victor Louis, A Monetay Union for Tomorrow?, 26 COMMON MKT. L. Rv.
301 (1989).
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State leaders had also become convinced that the time had come
for political revisions.
Accordingly, by the time Sweden applied in July 1991, and
still more when Finland and Norway applied in 1992, the Com-
munity was well-launched in a constitutional reorganization.
Although Denmark and the United Kingdom may well have pre-
ferred to negotiate and bring in the applicant states before the
restructuring occurred, this was not the view of the majority.
The Community, preoccupied with the process of adopting the
Maastricht Treaty, preferred to retard negotiations. In a popular
phrase, "deepening" the Community took precedence over
"widening" the Community.
The June 1990 Dublin European Council meeting decided
that the time was ripe for two intergovernmental conferences,
composed of Member State representatives, to be held in Rome
beginning in December 1990, one to work on political modifica-
tions, the other to develop a framework for an eventual eco-
nomic and monetary union." The two conferences worked in-
tensively for one full year, reporting back to and receiving in-
structions and proposals from the Member State governments,
as well as receiving proposals and comments from the Commis-
sion and the Parliament. When the conferences were unable to
attain agreement on certain key questions, the Maastricht Euro-
pean Council in December 1991 somewhat surprisingly man-
aged to work out acceptable compromises to most of the unset-
fled issues.67
Although often misunderstood as creating a European
Union, Article A of the Maastricht Treaty makes clear that the
Treaty is really still on the road, constituting "a new stage in the
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe."' Even so, the Maastricht Treaty represents the most
important restructuring of the institutions and expansion of the
constitutional dimensions of the Community since its incep-
66. 23 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 7-10 (1990). The principal agenda items for the two
Rome Intergovernmental Conferences were laid down by the European Council at its
Rome meeting on December 14-15, 1990. 23 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 7-11 (1990).
67. 24 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 7-8 (1991).
68. TEU, supra note 7, art. A. The first Resolved of the TEU's Preamble also refers
to the TEU as "a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the
establishment of the European Communities." Id. pmbl., 1.
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tion.6 9 Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty has given a new name to
the over-all structure, the European Union, and has replaced the
traditional term, European Economic Community, by the pithier
one, European Community.7 ° In fact, the European Commu-
nity, often called the "first pillar," represents virtually all of the
institutional structure and scope of operations, including the
new Economic and Monetary Union.7 ' The parts of the Euro-
pean Union which remain outside of the Community are com-
prised of the other two "pillars," Article J, the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, and. Article K, Cooperation in Justice and
Home Affairs, which have their own scope and decision-making
procedures.72
Undoubtedly to the great surprise of the leaders of the
Member States and of the Community institutions, the ratifica-
tion of the Maastricht Treaty proved neither quick nor easy. It is
true that ratification proved relatively rapid and overwhelmingly
favorable in most Member States, e.g., in Benelux, Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain.73 In Ireland, constitutional modifications
69. The achievements, compromises and complexity of the Maastricht Treaty has
provoked a voluminous literature, too numerous for citation here. All major texts
describing the European Community (now European Union) legal system published
since 1993 encompass the provisions of the TEU. See, e.g., BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAvEY &
Fox, supra note 28; STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAw (1998). Two fine
constitutional law studies are 2 INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
(Deirdre Curtin et al. eds., 1994); LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTrCHT TREATY (David
O'Keeffe & Patrick M. Twomey eds., 1994).
70. TEU, supra note 7, art. G(A) (1).
71. The Maastricht EMU provisions are contained in arts. 102a-109m of the EC
Treaty. For a helpful analysis, see J6rn Pipkorn, Legal Arrangements in the Treaty of Maas-
tricht for the Effectiveness of the Economic and Monetary Union, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 263
(1994).
72. Under Article J, the European Council provides guidelines on foreign and se-
curity policy, which the Council then carries out in a specific manner, usually voting by
unanimity, but occasionally by qualified majority vote. Article K essentially calls only for
coordination and cooperation in justice affairs, acting through the Council by unani-
mous vote, unless the Council decides unanimously to adopt implementing measures
by a qualified majority vote. Under Article L, the Court ofJustice does not have juris-
diction (with one exception) over issues arising in the scope of Articles J and K.
73. The principal stages in the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by each Mem-
ber State are outlined in 26 E.C. BULL., no. 10, at 121-22 (1993). Some notable exam-
ples of easy ratification occurred in Belgium, where the two chambers of Parliament
approved the TEU by an over 80% majority; in Greece, where the Greek Parliament
vote was 286 to 8; in Italy, where the Chamber and Senate votes were around 90%
favorable; in The Netherlands, where the Chamber voted 90% in favor and the Senate
was unanimous; in Portugal, where the Treaty and requisite constitutional amendments
were adopted by the Assembly with a near-90% majority; and in Spain, where both
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demanded a popular referendum, but the popular vote yielded
nearly a two-third margin of support.74 In Germany too, the
margin of parliamentary approval was overwhelming,75 although
media reports indicated a considerable level of skepticism about
the Maastricht Treaty in the population at large.
In a few Member States, however, instead of a triumphant
endorsement by legislatures and popular votes, the ratification
process became mired in bitter debates, often centered on Com-
munity issues quite irrelevant to the merits of the Maastricht
Treaty (such as the reduction of agricultural subsidies in order
to achieve agreement in the GATT Uruguay Round, or unpopu-
lar Court ofJustice judgments on issues of equal economic rights
of women or on fishing rights). Perhaps even more, the ratifica-
tion process was adversely affected by the unpopularity of partic-
ular Member State governments themselves. Thus, the narrow
adverse vote (51-49%) in the first Danish referendum in June
1992,76 followed by only a close 51% margin of victory in the
French referendum in September 1992, 77 created a sense of mal-
aise not only in the leadership of these two Member States, but
in others as well, and in the Community institutions.
Although media commentary often treated the ratification
difficulties as evidence of popular disenchantment with the
Union (disregarding the contrary evidence of easy approval in
most States), the Member State and Community leadership re-
garded the setbacks more as a failure to communicate the suc-
cesses of the Union to the public and as a sign that Brussels had
become the center of excessively detailed regulation. The Euro-
houses of Parliament approved the Treaty and requisite constitutional amendments by
99% majorities.
74. The Irish referendum, held on June 18, 1992, proved overwhelmingly
favorable: 69% yes to 31% no. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 29 (1992); 26 E.C. BULL., no. 10,
at 121 (1993). The Irish vote proved to be the brightest spot in the popular tests of the
Treaty during the ratification process.
75. The German Bundestag vote on December 2, 1992, was 543 to 17, while the
Bundesrat voted unanimously in favor on December 18, 1992. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at
47-48 (1992). The German parliamentary majority was all the more impressive because
the votes occurred after the setback in theJune 1992 Danish referendum and the disap-
pointing majority in the September 1992 French referendum.
76. 25 E.C. BuLL., no. 6, at 29 (1992); 26 E.C. BULL., no. 10, at 121 (1993). The
Danish Parliament had strongly endorsed the Maastricht Treaty in a vote, 130 to 25, on
May 12, 1992, but the Danish population was obviously not impressed by the vote, nor
by the strong support of the government and most political parties.
77. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 9, at 10 (1992).
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pean Council's reaction came in the form of the Declaration on
a Community Close to Its Citizens, adopted at the Birmingham
meeting in October 1992,78 and the famous Declaration on the
Application of the Subsidiarity Principle, issued in Edinburgh on
December 12, 1992."9 Commission President Jacques Delors,
commenting on the narrow French margin of approval, said no-
tably: "By voting 'no,' many French citizens have expressed anxi-
ety. It is our duty to respond . . . by consolidating the demo-
cratic process and .. .adapting the institutions through which
the aspirations of our citizens can be expressed and translated
into policy and action."8" He called this "one of the greatest
challenges we have yet had to face.""
The sense of malaise only deepened during the long and
laborious debates in the United Kingdom Parliament, culminat-
ing in a narrow margin of approval in July 1993.82 Only after the
European Council in Edinburgh in December 1992 granted cer-
tain face-saving concessions to Denmark was it possible to
achieve an affirmative vote of 57% in theJune 1993 Danish refer-
endum.83  Finally, after the German Constitutional Court re-
jected various challenges, some of them quite serious, to Ger-
many's ratification in October 1993,84 the Maastricht Treaty's ar-
duous birth could finally occur.
On this occasion, the October 1993 Brussels European
78. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 10, at 9 (1992).
79. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 9-10, 12-16 (1992). Even more important than this
Declaration is the Interinstitutional Declaration on Democracy, Transparency and Sub-
sidiarity, 26 E.C. BULL., no. 10, at 118-20 (1993), which sets out the guidelines agreed to
by the Commission, Council and Parliament for future institutional efforts to respect
these principles.
80. 25 E.G. BULL., no. 9, at 10 (1992).
81. Id.
82. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 10, at 122 (1993). Prime Minister Major had to make ap-
proval a vote of confidence in order to secure support from right-wing Tories. Philip
Stephens, Major Left Hanging on by Pyrrhic Victory, FIN. TIMEs, July 24, 1993, at 4.
83. The Edinburgh European Council adopted a Decision on Denmark and the
Treaty on European Union, which notably recognized that Denmark would not partici-
pate in Stage III of the Economic and Monetary Union (i.e., would not accept the
European currency nor the authority of the European Central Bank) and would not
participate in the defense aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 25 E.C.
BULL., no. 12, at 9, 24-26 (1992); Denmark and the Treaty on European Union, O.J. C
348/1 (1992).
84. 26 E.G. BULL., no. 10, at 20 (1993). For a helpful summary and analysis of the
long and complicated German Constitutional Court judgment, see Matthias Herdegen,
Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: Constitutional Restructuring for an "Ever
Closer Union", 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 235 (1994).
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Council issued a statement noting that "ratification has been the
occasion for a true public debate" which proved "salutary" even
though it revealed "weaknesses."8" The European Council
pledged greater efforts "to introduce greater transparency,
openness and decentralization in our procedures . . . [to
achieve] a Europe close to the citizen." 6 It is beyond the scope
of this Article to describe the impact of the application by the
Council, Commission and Parliament of the major new and re-
lated doctrines of subsidiarity and democratic transparency, but
it is certain that the exigencies of the ratification have sharply
modified future Union operational policies and procedures.
F. The Time Comes for the 1995 Enlargement
By the time the Maastricht Treaty entered into effect on No-
vember 1, 1993, Austria had been waiting four and Sweden two
years respectively. At least, as we shall see in Section IV(A) be-
low, the Commission had provided a favorable opinion on Aus-
tria's application onJuly 31, 1991,87 and on Sweden's application
on July 31, 1992.88 The Commission's favorable opinion on Fin-
land followed shortly thereafter on November 4, 1992,89 and that
on Norway (whose application was only filed on November 25,
1992) came expeditiously on March 24, 1993.90
It fell to the European Lisbon Council to conclude in June
1992 that the adoption of the European Economic Agreement
(which had occurred the month before in Oporto) "paved the
way" for negotiations with the EFTA applicants, which could be-
gin after ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.91 The Lisbon Eu-
ropean Council also stated a crucial condition: accession could
only take place on the basis of acceptance by the applicants of
the Maastricht Treaty.92
This condition implicitly meant that Austria, Finland, Nor-
way and Sweden would not be allowed to reject or modify the
Economic and Monetary Union provisions (even though the
85. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 10, at 19 (1993).
86. Id.
87. 24 E.C. BULL., no. 7/8, at 80-81 (1991).
88. 25 E.C. BULL., no 7/8, at 74 (1992).
89. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 11, at 76 (1992).
90. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 3, at 56 (1993).




United Kingdom and Denmark had, by separate Protocols, 93
been granted the right to opt out of the third stage of the EMU),
and none of the applicants could claim their traditional neutral-
ist principles to opt out of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy.
Six months after the Lisbon meeting, in December 1992 the
Edinburgh European Council was preoccupied by efforts to
bring the Maastricht ratification process to a successful conclu-
sion. The Edinburgh European Council wanted also to hasten
the start of negotiations with the applicant states, yet not to un-
dermine the principle that the applicants must accept the Maas-
tricht Treaty. Hence it authorized informal negotiations with
the applicant countries to begin in early 1993, with formal ones
to open only after the Treaty entered into force. 94 This was ac-
cordingly the ultimate approach: informal negotiations started
on February 1, 1993, converted into formal ones after November
1, 1993.
Because so much of the negotiating terrain had already
been covered in the elaboration of the substantive provisions of
the European Economic Area Agreement, the negotiations with
Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden proved remarkably quick,
especially in comparison to the six year long period required for
the accession negotiations with Portugal and Spain. A final deal-
making session of ministerial negotiations in late February and
early March 1994"5 paved the way for the signing of the Act of
Accession at Corfu on June 24, 1994.
The preceding description of the historical evolution lead-
ing to the January 1, 1995 accession of Austria, Finland and Swe-
den is in part intended to situate the accession within two con-
texts, that of the success of the internal market program, and
that of the transformation of the Community into the European
Union. It also is intended to facilitate understanding of some of
93. The right of Denmark and of the United Kingdom to opt out of participation
in the Economic and Monetary Union is contained in two Protocols bearing each one's
name. Protocol on Denmark, O.J. C 224/122 (1992); Protocol on Certain Provisions
Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, O.J. C 224/123
(1992); see supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting that Denmark exercised its
opt-out right in order to facilitate favorable vote in June 1993 referendum).
94. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 10 (1992).
95. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 3, at 64 (1993).'
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the issues raised, and their resolution, in later sections of this
Article.
Before ending, a final point. The arduous process of ratifi-
cation of the Maastricht Treaty, coupled with the clear dis-
enchantment of large sections of the population in some Com-
munity States, certainly created a major sense of malaise in 1992-
93. This malaise was deepened by two'economic factors, both
occurring despite the success of the internal market legislative
program: 1) the monetary turmoil in September 1992,96 in part
incited by concern over the outcome of the French referendum,
and the even more serious turmoil in August 1993, leading to
the partial breakdown of the European Rate Mechanism
("ERM") of the European Monetary System 97 ("EMS"), and 2)
the persistent high levels of unemployment virtually throughout
Western Europe.9"
By the middle of 1994, the realization that the governments
of Austria, Finland and Sweden were ready, willing and eager to
join the Union began to have a beneficial calming effect on the
psychological state of Community officials and Member State
leaders. Not surprisingly, the somewhat temporary sense of pes-
simism in Community (or Union) affairs produced by the set-
backs in the Maastricht ratification process has already begun to
dissipate. Instead, there is a growing climate of confidence that
the Union will progress still further, with its addition of three
politically strong and economically stable new States.
Thus the 1995 enlargement can be seen to have already pro-
duced an initial beneficial effect, by no means trivial in charac-
ter. The Union leadership has regained in large measure its
96. Attacks on their currencies forced Italy and Spain to devalue, and the United
Kingdom withdrew from the European Rate Mechanism, a serious blow to the opera-
tions of the European Monetary System. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 9, at 12-13 (1992).
97. A severe attack on the French Franc in favor of the German Mark obliged the
EMS authorities to broaden enormously the band within which currencies could float,
from 2.25% to 15% above or below the pegged central rate of exchange. 26 E.C. BULL.,
no. 7/8, at 21-22 (1993). This has seriously reduced the effectiveness of the European
Monetary System and set back progress to the EMU.
98. Unemployment levels have hovered around 8-12% in most Member States and
risen as high as 15-20%. See Commission of the European Communities, White Paper
on Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment, COM (93) 700 Final (Dec. 1993) (ana-
lyzing structural conditions of unemployment and possible future efforts to combat it).
The White Paper was requested by the European Council, whose December 10-11,
1993, Brussels session devoted considerable attention to an action plan based upon it.
26 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 7-11 (1993).
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confidence, and is turning its attention in a more positive and
optimistic manner to the future, to the development of the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union, to the challenges of the 1996 inter-
governmental conference, and to the prospect of further en-
largement later in this century, as the central European states
knock on the Union door.
Moreover, although their precise contributions are variable
and uncertain, Austria, Finland and Sweden are bound to pro-
mote significantly Union operations and policies. All three are
keenly interested in the on-going success of the internal market
and may be expected to support legislation to achieve its final
aspects. The depth of Finland's severe 1991-93 recession may
hinder its attainment of the convergence criteria for the third
stage of the EMU, but Austria and Sweden are likely to be
among the States which can ultimately qualify.
Probably more notable will be the three States' contribution
to "environmental and social protection, transparency and open
government," cited by the Corfu European Council last June
when it welcomed their accession.99 As we shall see in late sec-
tions of this Article, the three States have accepted the Maas-
tricht Social Protocol as part of the acquis communautaire, and
their strong traditions of social protection make them likely lead-
ers, and not merely supporters, in shaping future employee
rights and especially womens' rights legislation. In the environ-
mental field, the accession negotiations revealed that their pres-
ent standards were usually higher than those of the Community.
In order to preserve the transitional derogation for their present
rules, the three States are apt to lobby for new and higher Com-
munity environmental protection rules.
Austria, Finland and Sweden are all justly renowned for
their strong democratic traditions, with a particular emphasis on
transparency and human rights protection. The three States
may be expected to contribute initiatives as well as support for
more openness in Union decision-making, for efforts to make
European citizenship rights more tangible, and for functional
99. See supra note 5; see also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GENERAL
REPORT ON THE AcTIvITIEs OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1994, at 246 (1995) [hereinafter
1994 REPORT] ("The Union (may) step up its activities in the social and environmental
fields, drawing on the experience of its new members in these areas.").
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cooperation in justice affairs in order to remove barriers to
movement by people.
In the final section of this Article, we will consider the pros-
pects for further enlargement, particularly through the acces-
sion of central European states. Once in the Union club, Aus-
tria, Finland and Sweden can be expected to join those Member
States that desire such enlargement to come early rather than
late. Austria is bound to urge strongly the candidacies of central
European states with which it has historic cultural as well as com-
mercial ties. Finland and Sweden have traditional links with the
three Baltic states and are apt to work toward their accession.
Thus, the 1995 enlargement may serve as a stepping-stone to fu-
ture enlargement.
At this point, however, it is time to turn in this Article to an
extremely important subject: what changes in the institutional
structure of the Union occurred because of the 1995 enlarge-
ment?
II. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
AFTER THE 1995 ENLARGEMENT
A. The European Council Sets the Post-Enlargement
Institutional Structure
In June 1990, when the European Council decided in Dub-
lin to convene the Rome Intergovernmental Conference to
make political modifications in the Community structure, the
debate opened on how to make the institutions more demo-
cratic and more efficient. At its meeting in Rome on December
14-15, 1990, immediately before the opening of the Rome IGC,
the European Council set out the outline for an agenda, which
expressly included as goals the adoption of Treaty changes to
achieve "Democratic legitimacy," i.e., give more powers to Parlia-
ment, and greater "Effectiveness and efficiency," especially the
increased use of majority voting at the Council level in order to
make the decision-making process more efficient. 100
When the Maastricht Treaty was ultimately adopted, after
the cliff-hanging compromise agreements reached in the De-
cember 1991 Maastricht European Council, Parliament did re-
ceive a number of additional powers, the most important being a
100. 23 E.C. But.L., no. 12, at 9, 11 (1990).
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larger legislative role in the form of the new co-decision proce-
dure which now applies to most internal market legislation. 10 1
However, in many other vital spheres of Community action, such
as agriculture, competition, tax and social policy, Parliament's
role is still limited to giving opinions in the consultation pro-
cess, 10 2 and Parliament is not even consulted on most measures
leading to an Economic and Monetary Union.103 Moreover,
although the Maastricht Treaty added new fields in which quali-
fied voting is used when the Council acts upon proposed legisla-
tion, 04 the mode of Calculating the majority was not changed, so
that a relatively small blocking minority of States can still prevent
the Council from adopting a proposal.
Furthermore, the Maastricht European Council was not
able to resolve the issues which had deadlocked the Rome IGC
when it tried to decide upon the appropriate size and composi-
tion of the Commission and of the Parliament. With seventeen
members (one nominated by each State, with France, Italy, Ger-
many, Spain and the United Kingdom allowed to nominate a
second commissioner), the Commission is frequently criticized
as having. become unwieldy, too much of a committee and too
little of a functional executive body. As for the Parliament, at
the time the system of popular direct election of its members was
101. The co-decision procedure is set out in EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 189b. Its
most important field of use is for most internal market harmonization measures under
EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 100a. For a description of this complex procedure, see
Alan Dashwood, Community Legislative Procedures in the Era of the Treaty on European Union,
19 EUROPFAN L. REv. 343 (1994).
162. The EC Treaty, as amended by the TEU, accords Parliament only a right of
prior consultation in Article 43 (common agricultural policy), Article 87 (competition
policy), Article 99 (indirect taxes), and Article 100a(2) (fiscal provisions and employee
rights).
103. For example, Article 103 requires the Council to inform the Parliament about
its guidelines on economic policies, and Article 109 requires the President of the Coun-
cil to inform the Parliament about exchange rate decisions, but Parliament is not con-
sulted. Parliament, however, is to be consulted when the Member States nominate the
members of the European Monetary Institute (Article 109f(1)), and when the Council
recommends that certain States qualify for entry into the European currency system,
(Article 109j(2)).
. 104. Important new fields in which the Council now takes action by a qualified
majority vote are the harmonization of visa policies (Article 100c), movement to third
stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (Article 109j), education (Article 126),
health (Article 129), consumer protection (Article 129a) and most environmental pro-
tection measures (Article 130s).
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introduced in 1979, it became a very large body, totalling 518
members after the accession of Portugal and Spain.
A Declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty stated that
the Member States would, before the end of 1992, examine the
question of the number of members both of the Parliament and
the Commission, notably to consider the needs of "an enlarged
Community.""°5 To this date, no action has been taken with re-
gard to the Commission. However, the December 1992 Edin-
burgh European Council worked out a compromise solution to
the question of how to take into account Germany's much larger
population after unification in 1990, giving Germany ninety-nine
MEPs, but also augmenting the French, Italian and U.K. delega-
tions from eighty-one to eighty-seven and adding to the delega-
tions of several other States.106 Council Decision 93/81 formally
enacted this compromise.107 Thus, for the June 1994 elections,
Parliament totalled 567 members.
Once it became clear in 1992 that three or four new States
would join the Union, obviously the issue of structural modifica-
tion to the institutions became a burning one. The Commission
in its 1992 report on "Europe and the Challenge of Enlarge-
ment" emphasized the need to address the issue of efficiency for
each institution, but made no specific proposals. 108 The Com-
mission noted in particular the issue of the proper level for de-
termining the qualified majority in Council voting. In a resolu-
tion ofJuly 15, 1993, the Parliament also urged that the issues of
the democratic character and efficiency of the institutions be ad-
dressed in arranging the terms of the next enlargement. 10 9
Not surprisingly, it was the European Council which set the
terms to adjust the structure of the Union institutions in order to
include the additional States. As we have seen before, since the
practice of regular summit meetings began at the Hague in
1969, the Heads of State and Government have invariably taken
the most important policy and political decisions, cracking the
hard nuts when major issues have arisen. Article D of the Maas-
tricht Treaty expressly formalized in Treaty language the prior
105. Declaration on the Number of Members of the Commission and of the Euro-
pean Parliament, annexed to the TEU, supra note 7.
106. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 12 (1992); see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
107. oJ. L 33/15 (1993).
108. Challenge of Enlargement, supra note 13, at 15-16.
109. OJ. C 255/207 (1993), summarized in 26 E.C. BULL., no. 7/8, at 69 (1993).
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operational reality when it declared that the European Council
should "define the general political guidelines" of the Union."'
The Twenty-Seventh General Report observes that when deciding
upon the modification of the institutions, the European Coun-
cil's Brussels meeting in December 1993 formally exercised for
the first time this power set out in Article D.11
As we shall see, the European Council eschewed any radical
structural changes. In effect, it merely stretched the prior com-
position of each body, probably to the maximum size possible
without too serious a sacrifice in operational efficiency. Neither
the Commission nor the Parliament were particularly enthusias-
tic about the European Council conclusions - indeed, as de-
scribed in Section IV(D), the dissatisfaction of many MEPs
briefly imperiled the favorable parliamentary vote on accession.
For its part, the Commission in its final accession opinion of
April 19, 1994 bluntly described the institutional changes as only
"acceptable" temporarily, until the 1996 Intergovernmental Con-
ference might have the occasion to make further modifica-
tions.112
Manifestly, one of the most difficult agenda items for the
1996 IGC will be the nature of further structural revisions for
each institution in order to accommodate the possible addition
of another five, ten or fifteen states in the next enlargement, a
topic to which we will briefly return at the end of this Article.
At this point, let us analyze the changes in the structure or
operation of each institution produced by the 1995 enlarge-
ment.
B. The Council. Calculation of the Majority When Action Requires a
Qualified Majority Vote
Virtually all Council actions are taken either unanimously
or on the basis of a qualified majority vote. Apart from adopting
its own rules of procedure, or requesting the Commission to
present a proposal for legislation, the Council almost never acts
by a simple majority vote."' Nor has there been any serious at-
110. TEU, supra note 7, art. D.
111. TWENTY-SEvENTH REPORT, supra note 34, at 362, 1020.
112. Commission Opinion of 19 April 1994, fifth recital, O.J. C 241/3 (1994).
113. Article 151 of the EC Treaty does not prescribe a majority when the Council
sets its rules of procedure, nor does Article 152 when the Council requests the Commis-
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tempt to add new instances of simple majority voting. The ef-
forts in recent years to improve the Council's efficiency or its
democratic character have never centered on developing the ap-
proach of simple majority voting, but rather on transferring par-
ticular types of legislative action or other decision-making from
unanimous decisions to qualified majority voting.
As the number of Member States has grown, it has obviously
become more difficult to attain unanimity. With fifteen States,
there is clearly a greater risk that one will object to a proposal
than if there are only twelve, or nine, or six. The Commission
raised this point in its 1992 report on "Europe and the Chal-
lenge of Enlargement,"114 but it is unlikely that anyone seriously
thought the 1995 enlargement would be the occasion to shift
some legislative measures out of the unanimous vote category.
The question is, of course, apt to become more prominent if a
large number of applicants come forward in the next enlarge-
ment.
Successive amendments in the Single European Act and the
Maastricht Treaty have set qualified majority voting as the mode
to adopt most legislation to attain the internal market, protect
consumers or the environment, move to the third stage of the
EMU, etc." 5 Fortunately, the famous (or infamous) 1965 Lux-
embourg Compromise,' 1 6 by whose rather ambiguous terms any
large State could claim an effective veto on proposed measures,
appears to have become extinct. In several annual reports since
sion to submit a proposal. Accordingly, under Article 148(1), because no other major-
ity is stated, the Council may act by a simple majority.
114. Challenge of Enlargement, supra note 13, at 15.
115. See supra note 104.
116. In mid-1965, President De Gaulle of France, infuriated at certain Commission
proposals that he felt would transfer too much authority to the Community (but which
were all adopted after his death), ordered French representatives to cease participating
in Council meetings. This so-called "empty chair" policy paralyzed all important deci-
sion-making. At a special session in Luxembourg in January 1965, the Member States
issued a declaration intended to defuse the crisis. This "Luxembourg Compromise"
stated that when a State felt that important interests were at stake in a proposal that
could be adopted by qualified majority voting, the Council would try, at least for a
reasonable time, to reach a solution acceptable to all. Although quite ambiguously
worded and only a political accord, not an amendment to the Treaty, most observers
believe that the Luxembourg Compromise enabled the larger States to exercise an ef-
fective veto on legislation they opposed until the early 1980's. See BERMANN, GOEBEL,
DAvEY & Fox, supra note 28, at 54-55; PJ.G. K'rsEN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT,
INTRODUCnON TO THE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNriES 247-51 (Laurence W. Gor-
mley ed., 2d ed. 1989).
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the adoption of the SEA, the Commission has observed that the
States respect the use of qualified majority voting by the Council,
and that in debates on proposals Council members increasingly
strive to attain compromises instead of trying to block proposals
altogether.17
The qualified voting system is a bit arcane. From the incep-
tion of the EEC Treaty, the Member States have set a number of
weighted votes for each of them, to be used when qualified ma-
jority voting is the prescribed Treaty mechanism. France, Ger-
many, Italy, and the United Kingdom have always held the maxi-
mum weighted figure, ten votes each.' 18 As the next largest
state, Spain has eight votes, while the medium-sized states,
Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal, have five
each. 1 9 As for the smaller states, Denmark and Ireland have
three votes, and Luxembourg two.' These numbers were set in
an attempt to take into account each state's population and eco-
nomic power, but only in part. The system obviously gives the
smaller and medium-sized states a disproportionate vote in com-
parison with the five largest states. If population alone were de-
cisive, Germany should have over 200 weighted votes to Luxem-
bourg's one. Still, while not perfectly democratic, the system is
manifestly far more sensible and fair than the United States' con-
stitutionally mandated parity in two Senate seats each for both
very large and very small states. (It would be interesting to spec-
117. As noted before, the Single European Act introduced Article 100a of the EEC
Treaty, which enabled most internal market legislation to be adopted by a qualified
majority vote in the Council. For the Commission's expression of satisfaction with the
operational success of qualified majority voting after the SEA, see COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIND GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 1988 32, 4 (1989) [hereinafter TWENTY-SECOND REPORT]; TwENv-
FOURTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 359, 911; TWENTm-FwTH REPORT, supra note 25, at
363, 1147.
118. The initial EEC Treaty, March 25, 1957, set forth the qualified majority voting
system in Article 148(2), which allocated France, Germany and Italy the maximum fig-
ure of 10 votes each. When the United Kingdom joined in 1973, it was allocated 10
votes. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE
ActiviTiEs OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1972 20, 13 (1973) [hereinafter SIXTH
REPORT].
119. Spain received eight votes when it joined in 1986, and Greece and Portugal
five votes each when they joined, respectively in 1981 and 1986. EC Treaty, supra note
7, art. 148(2); see 12 E.C. BULL., no. 5, at 14-15 (1979) (Greece); 19 E.C. BULL., no. 1, at
8 (1986) (Portugal and Spain).
120. Denmark and Ireland were allotted three votes each when they joined in
1973. SIXTH REPORT, supra note 118, at 20, 13.
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ulate how the U.S. legislative process would change if we used
weighted voting in the Senate, e.g., giving California and New
York senators five votes each, with lesser votes of four, three or
two for medium-sized states, and only one vote per senator from
the half-dozen smallest states.)
The easy part in handling the applications of Austria, Fin-
land, Norway and Sweden was the determination of the weighted
votes to be allotted to each. The Brussels European Council al-
located four each to Austria and Sweden, the larger applicants in
population and economic power, and three each to Finland and
Norway. 12 1 Because Norway ultimately declined to join the
Union, this has meant the addition of three more States with low
weighted votes, altogether eleven votes for all three. The total
number of weighted votes in the Council has accordingly risen
from seventy-six to eighty-seven. However, speaking in terms of
their weighted votes, instead of five larger states, four medium-
sized, and three smaller ones, after the 1995 enlargement, there
are five larger states (eight to ten votes), six medium-sized (four
to five votes), and four smaller ones (two to three votes).
Manifestly, if Council voting were based on a simple major-
ity of weighted votes, before the 1995 enlargement the four larg-
est States, with forty votes among them, would have been able to
constitute a majority of the seventy-six total. Even after the 1995
enlargement, these four together with Spain could constitute
forty-eight votes, or together with any one of the six States pos-
sessing four or five votes, could constitute forty-four or forty-five,
a simple majority of the new eighty-seven vote total.
It is easy to see that the Heads of State and Government
regard it as essential to set a qualified voting majority at some-
where around the two thirds mark, in order to ensure that a suf-
ficiently large number of States back a measure before it can be
adopted. On the other hand, the larger States clearly do not
relish being outvoted. Consequently, they have wanted the req-
uisite qualified majority vote to be set at a level at which it is
unlikely that too many large States can be outvoted. The key
issue is, of course: how many is too many?
After the first enlargement in 1973, the then nine States all
were allocated their current number of weighted votes, totalling
121. 26 E.C. BuLL, no. 12, at 18 (1993).
1995] 1123
1124 FORDHAMINTERNTATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1092
fifty-eight. The qualified majority vote was set at forty-one. 122
Thus, seventeen negative votes could not bar legislation; while
eighteen represented a blocking minority. In effect, this meant
that one large State (ten votes) and one medium-sized State (five
votes) could be outvoted, or even a large State and two small
States (two or three votes) could be outvoted - but never two
large States.
After the second enlargement in 1986, the votes of the
Community of Twelve totalled seventy-six. The qualified major-
ity was set at fifty-four. States cumulating twenty-two votes could
be outvoted, while twenty-three votes now became the blocking
minority. Thus, since 1986, two large States (twenty votes) could
be outvoted - obviously a serious concession made by the large
States. However, if two large States were joined by any State
other than Luxembourg (two votes), they would hit the magic
number of twenty-three and could not be outvoted.
Although it agreed on the number of weighted votes to be
allocated to the new states, the Brussels European Council was
unable to determine the second part of the equation used in the
qualified majority voting process, namely the requisite majority
of the new eighty-seven vote total. (At the time they considered
the issue, the projected total was ninety, including three votes
for Norway.) Discussion on this continued into 1994. The bone
of contention was the Major Government's insistence that the
blocking minority of negative votes should remain at twenty-
three. Chancellor Kohl, President Mitterand and almost all the
other Member State leaders felt that the blocking minority fig-
ure should rise proportionately to twenty-seven. 121
The Member State leaders remained deadlocked until the
end of March, largely because Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain
lent some support to Prime Minister Major's position, 24 perhaps
in part as a tactical maneuver to win concessions sought by Spain
in the hard-fought accession negotiations with Norway over fish-
ing rights (see Section IV(C) below). Finally, at a Council meet-
ing atJoanina in Greece on March 26-27, 1994, the Greek presi-
dency devised a face-saving solution.
122. SIXTH REPORT, supra note 118, at 20, 13.
123. EU-Kohl Infuriated by 'Incomprehensible' UK Moves to Deny Admission to Four New
Countries, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Mar. 10, 1994, at 12; Stephens, supra note 82, at 4.
124. Ministers Fail to Break Deadlock over Blocking Minority Voting Ratio, EuRoWATcH,
Mar. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurwch File.
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At Joanina, the Council set the new requisite qualified ma-
jority vote at sixty-four out of ninety, so that the blocking minor-
ity would be twenty-seven, the figure preferred by all the States
but the United Kingdom. 125 Subsequently, after Norway's nega-
tive referendum, in January 1995 the Council slightly altered the
figure so that the majority became sixty-two out of eighty-seven
votes, and the blocking minority thus went down one to twenty-
six votes.126 The new system has the effect that two large States
(twenty votes) plus two small States (three + two votes) can be
outvoted. Alternatively, one large State (ten votes), plus as many
as five smaller States (four + three + three + three + two) can be
outvoted. (After all the debate, this hardly seems a very dramatic
shift from the present system.)
The Council then added a resolution, the so-called Joanina
Compromise. If a negative vote on any proposal were to hit the
current blocking minority figure of twenty-three, but would be
less than the new blocking minority of twenty-seven, than "the
Council will do all in its power to reach, within a reasonable time
... a satisfactory solution that could be adopted by at least sixty-
eight votes. 12 7 After Norway abandoned its application, remov-
ing three votes from the calculation of a qualified majority, the
Joanina Compromise language was likewise adjusted to set sixty-
five votes as the desired minimum level for a "satisfactory solu-
tion. '  The language recalls that used in the Luxembourg
Compromise, which effectively prevailed in Council voting until
the early 1980's.129 The Joanina Compromise, like the Luxem-
bourg Compromise, represents a calculated ambiguity. No one
125. Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the
Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the Ad-
justments to the Treaties on Which the European Union is Founded, art. 15, O.J. C
241/21, at 24 (1994) (hereinafter 1994 Act of Accession] (amending EC Treaty, supra
note 7, art. 148(2)).
126. Council Decision of 1January 1995, art. 8, O.J. L 1/1, at 3 (1995) (adjusting
instruments concerning accession of new Member States to European Union). Article
2 of the 1994 Act of Accession, supra note 125, O.J. C 241/21, at 21 (1994), delegated
the power to the Council, "acting unanimously," to adjust these instruments if any ap-
plicant state did not ratify the Act of Accession.
127. Council Decision of 29 March 1994, art. 1, O.J. C 105/1 (1994) (concerning
taking of Decision (sic) by qualified majority by Council). Described at greater length
in E.U. BuLL., no. 3, at 65 (1994).
128. Council Decision of 1January 1995, o.J. C 1/1 (amending Council Decision
of March 29, 1994) (1995).
129. See supra note 116.
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can predict what "a reasonable time" should be, nor when the
Council has done "all within its power to reach... a satisfactory
solution."
The Commission was clearly unhappy with the Joanina
Compromise. In an unusually critical statement on March 30,
1994, the Commission called the Compromise "a political decla-
ration," meaning implicitly that it has no legally binding force.1
3 0
The Commission further warned that these "transitional ar-
rangements . . .should not set a precedent which would influ-
ence the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference."13 As described
in Section IV(D) later, many MEPs were also highly dissatisfied
with the Joanina Compromise, and threatened to vote against
approval of the accession of new states because of it.
The future operation of the Council will tell us whether the
Joanina Compromise will be essentially ignored in close votes af-
ter the 1995 enlargement, or whether the United Kingdom or
other States will insist on making the Joanina Compromise a
genuine limitation on Council action in close votes.
C. The Rotation of the Presidency of the Council and the
European Council
Formally, the accession arrangements made no change in
the operations of the European Council. But in fact, with no
fanfare and little attention, the Brussels European Council sig-
nificantly changed the mode of selection of the presidency of
the European Council, as well as that of the Council. Article D
of the Maastricht Treaty states that the presidency shall be held
for six months by the Head of State or Government whose Mem-
ber State is president of the Council.132
From the inception of the European Community, the presi-
dency of the Council has rotated in alphabetical order among
the States, each holding it for six months. The presidency is not
simply a ceremonial role. The Council President calls and chairs
all meetings,13 controlling in large measure the pace of discus-
sions, the order of recognition of speakers, and the timing of
130. E.U. BULL., no. 3, at 65 (1994).
131. Id. Joint Declaration No. 8, annexed to the 1994 Act of Accession, supra note
125, states that qualified majority voting will be examined during the 1996 IGC. OJ. C
241/21, at 383 (1994).
132. TEU, supra note 7, art. D.
133. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 147.
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votes. Moreover, the Council President also determines to a sub-
stantial degree the agenda of meetings, setting the priority
among possible topics, accelerating the review of some proposals
and postponing action on others.
The influential role of the presidency is likewise evident in
the European Council's bi-annual or special meetings, whose
agenda is also in some measure set by the President."' Indeed,
since the mid-1980's, the government of the State holding the
presidency of the Council and the European Council has made a
point of announcing the agenda of matters to which it proposes
to devote special or urgent attention during its presidency.
Either the President of the European Council, or the Foreign
Minister of the President's State now also customarily addresses
the Parliament at the outset of its presidency to outline this
agenda and express views on current issues confronting the
Union. ' The President likewise supervises the formulation of
the lengthy European Council conclusions, policy statements,
and press releases, and customarily reports to the Parliament at
the conclusion of each European Council meeting.13 6
Six months is obviously an extremely short term for a func-
tional presidency. In order to promote continuity in the legisla-
tive process and in general decision-making, whether in Council
or European Council meetings, since the late 1980's a "troika"
system has operated - the current President's office is supple-
mented by representatives from the immediate past and the next
President's staff. Only the current President has the preroga-
tives of the chair and spokesperson, but his or her staff can oper-
ate more efficiently due to the coordination with these repre-
sentatives of the past and next presidency.
As noted above, the rotation of the presidency has always
been alphabetical (based on each State's spelling of its name),
although a slight modification was introduced at the time of the
second enlargement. The Member States wanted to avoid a rota-
tion in which each State always returned to take over the presi-
dency in the same first or second six month period - this was
134. SIMON BULMER & WOLFGANG WESSELS, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL: DECISION-
MAKING IN EUROPEAN POLMCS 11, 52 (1987); J. WERTS, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 91-95
(1992).
135. The January and July-August EC Bulletins usually summarize these addresses
in the review of Parliament's activities.
136. BuLmER & WESSELs, supra note 134, at 56-58; WErTs, supra note 134, at 158-59.
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felt to be undesirable, because the second six month presidency
has the critically important but also extremely arduous task of
supervising the process of the adoption of the annual Commu-
nity budget. Accordingly, in the current six year cycle which be-
gan in 1993, Article 146 of the EEC Treaty prescribed an in-
verted order for the two States taking the presidency in each
year.1 37 To make this understandable, take the current years as
examples. In 1993, Denmark held the presidency in the first six
months, while Belgium held it in the second six months, in in-
verted alphabetical order. Similarly, in 1994 Greece preceded
Germany, and in 1995 France precedes Spain (Espafia in Span-
ish).
This rotation system was significantly modified by the Brus-
sels European Council. Instead of simply adding Austria, Fin-
land, Norway and Sweden to the alphabetical cycle, the Euro-
pean Council accelerated the timing of the presidency of the five
largest States: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United
Kingdom.13 ' The new system dictates that a large State assume
the presidency at least once in every third six-month period.
Thus, after the United Kingdom holds the presidency in the first
six months of 1998 as originally scheduled, Germany is acceler-
ated to take the presidency in the first half of 1999, France in the
second half of 2000, etc. 139 Presumably, the motive for this mod-
ification is not only to ensure that the five largest States hold the
presidency more often, but also to guarantee that one of them
137. The second cycle set forth in Article 146 of the EEC Treaty (not modified by
the Maastricht Treaty) is as follows: Denmark, Belgium, Greece, Germany, France,
Spain, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Portugal.
138. The Brussels European Council directed the Council to set the precise order
of the rotating presidency from 1995 to 2003. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 18 (1993). The
list had to be altered to delete Norway after its people declined to join the Union. The
list of rotation, commencing in 1995, is as follows; France, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Nether-
lands,Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Austria, Germany, Finland, Portugal, France,
Sweden, Belgium, Spain, Denmark, Greece, which covers the period until the first half
of 2003. Council Decision of 1 January 1995, art. 1(1), OJ. L 1/220 (1995) (determin-
ing order in which office of President of Council shall be held). This means that the
former second cycle of Article 146 was kept until the second half of 1998, when Austria
assumes the presidency for the first time.
139. If strict alphabetical order had been respected, Portugal would have com-
pleted the second cycle with the second half of 1998 presidency, Belgium and Denmark
would have preceded Germany (Deutschland), Spain (Espafia) would have preceded
France, etc. Booss & Forman, supra note 1, at 113, observe that the European Council
did not want an unbroken sequence of seven presidencies provided by small and me-
dium sized-countries."
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always participates in the "troika" continuity system described
above.
It is quite possible that this approach is intended to serve as
a precedent in the event that further States join the Union, thus
adding to the long alphabetical list. It may well be that after a
further enlargement the five largest States will continue to take
the presidency once in every three bi-annual periods.
Furthermore, the Brussels European Council also decided
that the Council should, by unanimous vote, set the order in
which States should hold the presidency. 140 Article 146 of the
EC Treaty was amended by the Act of Accession to achieve this
result.' This might enable action to permit a larger Member
State to be accelerated to hold the presidency in time of emer-
gency.
Austria, Finland and Sweden were, of course, put into the
alphabetical sequence among the medium-sized and smaller
Member States (in accordance with their own spelling of their
names). Austria (Oesterreich) will hold the presidency in the
second six months of 1998, Finland (Suomi) the second half of
1999, and Sweden (Sverige) in the first half of 2002.142 Un-
doubtedly, the Brussels European Council felt it more prudent
to virtually complete the current cycle of rotation, which lasts
until 1998, before starting to include Austria, Finland and Swe-
den in a new cycle, thus ensuring that the new States gain experi-
ence in the Council and European Council before assuming the
important role of the presidency.
D. The Commission
The Brussels European Council quite readily decided that
each applicant should be entitled to nominate one member of
the Commission. 143 Because Austria, Finland and Sweden joined
in January 1995, their nominees simply joined those designated
by the other States for the 1995-99 Commission headed by Presi-
140. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 18 (1993). This will eliminate any need to amend
the Treaty to set a new cycle when the current one runs out in 2003.
141. 1994 Act of Accession, supra note 125, art. 12, O.J. C 241/21, at 23 (1994).
142. For the current list, see supra note 138.
143. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 16 (1993). Article 157 of the EC Treaty was accord-
ingly amended by the Act of Accession to set the membership of the Commission at 21,
and then reamended to 20. Council Decision of 1 January 1995, supra note 126, art. 9,
O.J. L 1/1, at 4 (1995).
1995] 1129
1130 FORDHAMIANTERATATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1092
dent Jacques Santer.144 The Commission thus now consists of
twenty members.
Because there are twenty-three Directorates-General, this
means that each Commissioner is responsible for at least one
Directorate-General, his or her portfolio. This certainly contrib-
utes to a rational system of authoritative administrative supervi-
sion of the Commission's civil service bureaucracy by members
of the Commission.
On the other hand, as already noted, a Commission of
twenty members is a very large body to be involved in collective
decision-making. Indeed, much of the most important work of
the Commission is collective in character - the taking of policy
decisions on the launching or modification of legislative propos-
als, on budgetary matters, on agricultural, competition or trade
issues. 145
It is certain that at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference
the size of the Commission will have to be examined, particularly
in view of the potential for future enlargement of the Union,
bringing additional requests for commissioners from perhaps
five, ten or even fifteen new states.
E. The Parliament
The December 1993 Brussels European Council attributed
twenty-one MEPs to Sweden, twenty to Austria and sixteen to Fin-
land.'4 6 This brings Parliament's total membership to 624. Arti-
cle 31 of the Act of Accession provides that the new States' na-
tional parliaments shall initially select representatives who will
serve starting January 1, 1995 in the Parliament elected in June
1994.147 During 1995 or 1996, Austria, Finland and Sweden
must hold direct elections to replace these interim representa-
tives. The same transitional approach of permitting representa-
tives of the national parliaments for a two-year maximum period,
pending direct election of permanent MEPs, was used when
144. Austria nominated Mr. Fischler, Finland Mr. Likaneu, and Sweden Mrs. Gra-
din, and they were duly designated members of the Commission starting January 1,
1995. Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the
European Communities of 1 January 1995, O.J. L 1/222 (1995).
145. On the policy-making role of the Commission, see KA"EvN & VERLOREN VAN
THEMAAT, supra note 116, at 125-26.
146. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 17 (1993).
147. 1994 Act of Accession, supra note 125, art. 31(2), O.J. C 241/21, at 27 (1994).
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Greece, Portugal and Spain joined during the term, respectively,
of the 1979-84 and 1984-89 Parliaments.14 8
The 1989-94 Parliament consisted of 518 members. With
the combined effect of Council Decision 93/81 and the 1995
enlargement, Parliament has grown by over 100, to 624.
Although there are national parliaments of comparable size, this
is clearly a large number. With the prospect of further enlarge-
ment, it may well prove necessary to fix a ceiling for Parliament's
maximum size, to avoid the inefficiencies which spring from ex-
cessive numbers. The increase of over 100 MEPs within a short
time has already strained Parliament's building and staff facili-
ties both in Brussels and Strassbourg, occasioning further admin-
istrative costs in an already tight budgetary climate.'4 9
F. The Court ofJustice
The Court ofJustice has always consisted of one judge nomi-
nated by each Member State. This practice continued with the
1995 enlargement. This brings the total number of judges to
fifteen, 5 ° which, as we shall see, facilitates Court operations in
two ways.
After the accession of Greece in 1981, a system of one judge
per State would have resulted in tenjudges. In order to avoid tie
votes in adjudication, the Member States set the membership of
the Court of Justice at eleven judges, the eleventh judge rotating
by lot among the larger Member States.' 5' When Portugal and
Spain joined in 1986, the number of judges increased from
eleven to thirteen. 52  After enlargement in 1995, the total
number of judges rises to fifteen, already an odd figure. The
added judge, to avoid tie votes, can therefore disappear. This is
148. Act of Accession for Greece, supra note 12, O.J. L 291/17 (1979); Act of Ac-
cession for Spain and Portugal, supra note 12, OJ. L 302/23 (1985).
149. Battle Over Parliament's Home Threatens European Elections, EUROWATCH, Mar. 7,
1994, at 6-7, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurwch File.
150. Council Decision of I January 1995, supra note 126, art. 10(1), O.J. L 1/1, at 4
(1995).
151. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIFTEENTH GENERAL REPORT ON
THE AcnrvmEs OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1981, at 32, 1 34 (1982); see KAPrEYN &
VERLoREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 145, at 147.
152. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE
AcTvrrIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1986, at 40-41, 1 849 (1987) [hereinafter
TWENIETH REPORT].
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the first way in which the 1995 enlargement has facilitated Court
operations.
Because Norway's, accession had been anticipated, which
would have meant a Court of sixteen judges, a seventeenth judge
had been scheduled. Under the past arrangements, in the Octo-
ber 1994 cycle of nominations to the Court (half the Court is
nominated every three years for a six-year term), Spain lost its
second judge and Italy gained one. Judge La Pergola, thus
named by Italy, served as judge during the Fall 1994 term. Now,
by virtue of the Brussels European Council decision, as reflected
in a January 1995 amendment to the Act of Accession, Judge La
Pergola will become an advocate-general for the remainder of
his six-year term, thus ensuring that the number of judges
should stay fifteen." '
Prior to the 1995 enlargement, the Court of Justice in-
cluded six advocates-general, 154 one each named by the four
largest States (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom)
and two rotating by lot among the other States. The Act of Ac-
cession increased the number of advocates-general to eight (but,
as noted above, Advocate-General La Pergola will make nine un-
til 2000).155 The addition of two (and temporarily three) advo-
cates-general should help the Court of Justice to expedite the
handling of its case load. The Brussels European Council de-
cided that Spain should receive its own advocate-general, and
that three advocates-general should rotate among the smaller
States. 56 A Council Declaration of January 1, 1995 embodies
this approach, stating that Denmark, Greece and Ireland should
each nominate an advocate-general initially. 15 7 The right to
nominate advocates-general will then move in sequence, starting
in 1997 with Luxembourg, Portugal, then in 2000 going to the
153. Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of
the European Communities of I January 1995, art. 4, O.J. L 1/223 (1995) (appointing
judges and advocates-general). This approach was foreseen by the European Council as
a contingency measure if one applicant should not join the Union. 26 E.C. BULL., no.
12, at 17 n.1 (1993).
154. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 166.
155. Council Decision of 1 January 1995, supra note 126, art. 11, oJ. L 1/1, at 4
(1995).
156. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 17 (1993).
157. Joint Declaration on Article 31 of the Decision Adjusting the Instruments
Concerning the Accession of the New Member States to the European Union, OJ. L 1/
221 (1995).
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Netherlands and Austria, and so on to Finland and Sweden. 158
The Court of Justice's increase to fifteen judges necessarily
affects the quorum required for a plenary or full court vote,
which will now be nine judges.159 What will be particularly ap-
preciated at the Court, however, is the greater ability to work in
chambers, or panels of judges. The Act of Accession enables
chambers of three, five, or seven judges.16° Because a chamber
of five judges will usually be considered a sufficiently representa-
tive panel, the Court will be able to assign a large percentage of
its docket to three different chambers of five judges each. It may
be hoped that greater work in chambers will expedite the
Court's handling of its cases, and reduce its high backlog. This
facilitation of Court operations through chambers represents
the second major benefit provided by the increase to fifteen
judges, along with the elimination of the rotating additional
judge.
The Court of First Instance's membership will now increase
from twelve to fifteen judges. 6' This will also facilitate its opera-
tion through more chambers. There are no designated advo-
cates-general at the Court of First Instance - the Court itself
names one of its members to serve in the role of advocate-gen-
eral for any case where that would be useful. 6 The 1995 en-
largement did not affect that practice, which is generally be-
lieved to be a successful mode of operations. An interesting side
point, however, is that Finland and Sweden each named women
as their initial Court of First Instance judges 63 - there are at
present no women judges or advocates-general at the Court of
Justice.
A transitional provision, Article 157(6) of the Act of Acces-
sion, governs the handling of cases pending before the Court of
158. Id.
159. 1994 Act of Accession, supra note 125, art. 19, O.J. C 247/21, at 25 (1994).
160. Id. art. 18.
161. Decision of the Council of 1 January 1995, supra note 126, art. 10, O.J. L 1/1,
at 4 (1995).
162. Henry G. Schermers & Denis F. Waelbroeck, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EU-
ROPEAN COMMUNITIES 511 (5th ed. 1992).
1 163. They are, respectively, Mrs. Tilli and Mrs. Lindh. Decision of the Representa-
tives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Communities, O.J. L
1/224 (1995) (appointing members of Court of First Instance).
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Justice at the time of the 1995 enlargement. 164 If oral proceed-
ings were commenced before January 1, 1995, then the full
Court or chamber, as the case may be, will continue adjudicating
the matter without the participation of the judges named by Aus-
tria, Finland and Sweden. If oral proceedings are begun after
January 1, 1995, then the new judges will be fully involved.
It is possible that further enlargement of the Union will not
pose as serious a problem for the structure of the Court of Jus-
tice or the Court of First Instance, as it will for other institutions.
By working increasingly in chambers, a court of nineteen,
twenty-five or even twenty-nine judges might still be able to func-
tion efficiently. Many national supreme courts are in fact even
larger in size than that.
Increasing adjudication by chambers does pose a certain
risk, however, namely that chamber judgments may not always
reflect the views of the full Court. It is true that at present a case
preliminarily assigned to a chamber may be transferred to the
full Court docket if the President of the Court becomes con-
vinced that the issues are too vital for resolution by a chamber.
However, the importance of particular issues or the likely mode
of their resolution is not always apparent until after the chamber
judgment has been rendered. Under the current Court proce-
dure, it is then too late to bring the case to the full Court.
At some point the Court of Justice may want to consider
adopting the procedure permitted by the U.S. Federal Judiciary
Code to govern the handling of judgments by panels in federal
circuit courts.1 65 This rule permits a losing party in a panel deci-
sion to request an en banc review of the panel judgment by the
full circuit court membership. Any judge of the circuit court
may make the same request. In each case, whether or not to
review the panel decision is a discretionary determination made
by the full circuit court. This procedure ensures that particularly
important panel rulings, or rulings that may deviate from prior
precedents or otherwise may perhaps not be representative of
the full circuit court, can on occasion be reconsidered by that
body. En banc reviews are used sparingly, but when used are
164. 1994 Act of Accession, supra note 125, art. 157(6), O.J. C 247/21, at 49
(1994).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1988).
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generally endorsed as a desirable and effective means of ensur-
ing authoritative judgments.
G. Official and Working Languages
Although the decision on which languages to use for which
purposes within the European Union may be considered to raise
primarily operational or functional issues, in fact it has a legal
dimension that warrants reflection in this section.
Article 248, the final article in the original Treaty of Rome
requires that the Treaty be "drawn up in a single original in the
Dutch, French, German and Italian languages, all four texts be-
ing equally authentic." 16 As new Member States have joined the
Community, and now the Union, their official languages have
been added to the list. Thus, Article 3 of the Treaty between the
Union and the acceding states (as amended on January 1, 1995)
prescribes a total of twelve equally authentic versions: Danish,
Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian,
Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. 167
Since the constituent Treaty (now the Treaty on European
Union, as modified by the Act of Accession) is a public interna-
tional law instrument, it is self-evident that it must exist in all the
official languages of the signatories, each having equal authen-
ticity (i.e., equal value and authority). But what should be the
situation for lesser legal norms (legislation, international agree-
ments, decisions) within the legal structure of the Union, or for
information (proceedings, reports, studies), or for operations
conducting orally (Council, Commission, Parliament and Court
proceedings, staff meetings, conferences)? Article 217 of the EC
Treaty grants the Council the power to decide, acting unani-
mously, "the rules governing the languages of the institu-
tions."1 6 8
The traditional answer to the question posed above has
been that all written material that has a legally binding effect
must be published in all the official languages of the Community
(now the Union). Accordingly, the OfficialJournal, which must
publish final legislation (regulations and directives, whether
166. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 248.
167. O.J. C 241/9, at 14 (1994), as substituted by Decision of the Council of 1 Janu-
ary 1995, art. 1, o.J. L 1/1, at 1 (1995).
168. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 217 (not changed by TEU).
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adopted by the Parliament and Council, the Council or the
Commission), and Council and Commission decisions addressed
to the Member States, is published in all the official languages,
except for Irish.169 The Official Journal also customarily pub-
lishes the text of important international agreements, Commis-
sion decisions addressed to private parties (e.g., in competition
proceedings), and Commission proposals for legislation. Simi-
larly, the judgments and orders of the Court of Justice and the
Court of First Instance are likewise published in all the official
languages.1 70 Other material of an official character, although
not legally binding, such as the resolutions and proceedings of
Parliament or the Economic and Social Council or the Court of
Auditors, are also customarily published in all official languages.
In addition, an enormous amount of material that has no
legal effect as such, but constitutes a valuable source of informa-
tion, is likewise published in the official languages. Starting at
the highest level, this necessarily includes the Commission's an-
nual general reports to the Parliament, the monthly Bulletin of
the European Union, the Commission's annual sectoral reports
on agriculture, competition, social policy, the environment, etc.,
and green papers and white papers on important fields of ac-
tion. Moving downward in the scale of importance, the Commis-
sion publishes a positive flood of reports, studies and accessory
documents in every area in which the Union is involved. The
169. Article 191 of the EEC Treaty only required regulations to be published in
the Official Journal, but Article 191 of the TEU added the materials mentioned in the
text, which in fact have long been published in the Official Journal. Note, however,
that the Official Journal is not published in Irish, because the Republic of Ireland has
graciously accepted that Irish need not be a working language, although still an official
language.
170. Except, as noted in the prior footnote, in Irish. However, Article 31 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Court ofJustice prescribes that the authentic language of the
judgment is the "language of the case," which Article 29 indicates to be usually the
language of the applicant to the Court or the referring judge in an Article 177 proceed-
ing. Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 19
June 1991, arts. 29-30, O.J. L 176/7, at 13-14 (1991). Therefore, strictly speaking, all
other language versions (even French, the working language of the Court) are only
translations and should yield to the language of the case in the event of any inconsis-
tency. A study in 1990 showed that in that year German was the most common lan-
guage of the case (146 out of 384 actions), followed by French (79 out of 384), then
Italian, English, Dutch, Greek, Portuguese and Danish. SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK,
supra note 162, at 466. It should also be noted that all pleadings and supporting docu-
ments must be submitted to the Court in the language of the case. Id.
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Council and the Parliament contribute their special reports and
studies as well, but in lesser volume.
Turning to the spoken word, all sessions and meetings of
bodies engaged in the production of legally-binding material, or
in the taking of decisions of an important policy nature, are inva-
riably translated simultaneously by interpreters into all of the of-
ficial languages. Thus, all meetings of the Council of Ministers
and its Committee of Permanent Representatives, all plenary ses-
sions and committee meetings of the Parliament, and all oral
arguments before the Court of First Instance are simultaneously
translated. By tradition, however, when the Court of Justice and
the Court of First Instance meet to deliberate on the outcome of
a case, the judges work exclusively in French, without the pres-
ence of interpreters, in order to preserve judicial secrecy.171
At lower levels, the picture is less clear-cut. Working groups
of the Council of Ministers and conferences of Member State
representatives, or representatives of industry, labor, the public,
scientific and technical bodies, consumer groups, etc., convened
to provide information and input to the Commission, the Coun-
cil and Parliament customarily operate through simultaneous
translation in order to gain a good level of mutual understand-
ing, but on occasion may agree to work only in one language, or
in two or three languages. Staff meetings and office conferences
at the Commission or Council, especially if comprised of only a
few people, usually work in English, French and occasionally
German or another language, which everyone is presumed to
speak and understand.
The cost of translation of written materials and oral pro-
ceedings into all official languages is simply enormous. The staff
of interpreters and translators employed by the Commission, the
Council, Parliament and the Court has constituted about twelve
percent of total personnel, and hence of personnel costs, in re-
cent years.17 To this must be added the indirect cost produced
171. When the Court ofJustice was first constituted as the Court of the Coal and
Steel Community, it adopted French as its working language, apparently as a matter of
convenience. The tradition has persisted, though not required by its rules. Not only
does the full Court deliberate in French, but chambers usually do so as well, and draft
judgments are usually prepared and circulated for review in French. KArEYN &
VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 116, at 65.
172. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TWENTY-SIXTH GENERAL REPORT
ON THE AcrwrrIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1992, at 379, 1107 (1993) indi-
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by delay in the translation of written materials, which invariably
adds days, weeks, and even months before important material
can be released. (The Court of Justice until recently had
reached nearly a two-year delay in the publication of reports of
its judgments.) 17 3 Finally, there is the risk of imperfect, ambigu-
ous or even totally erroneous translation, which can occur not
only in the rapid pace of simultaneous interpretation, but even
in the painstaking process of translation of legal texts.
These costs will be substantially increased by the addition of
Finnish and Swedish as official languages. (This is the only con-
text in which one can derive a grain of comfort from the Norwe-
gian refusal to join the Union!) Hundreds of new interpreters
and translators must be added to the present staff of each institu-
tion.1 74 The need to be sure of accurate translation into all the
official languages before a text can be published will further re-
tard final publication. The problems are perhaps even greater
for simultaneous translation, because it is difficult to find quali-
fied personnel for relatively rare combinations of languages
(e.g., Finnish-Portuguese, or Greek-Swedish). This will probably
mean an increased use of rapid double translation (e.g., Greek
to English to Swedish, or Finnish to French to Portuguese), but
this raises incrementally the risk of imperfect translation.
Ever since the Mediterranean enlargement added three new
official languages there has been considerable concern about
the cost, delays and difficulties in ensuring accurate translation
and interpretation into so many language versions. This con-
cern has been materially augmented by the addition of Finnish
and Swedish. Still, there was never any serious question raised
during the negotiations of any outcome other than the addition
of new official languages.
cated that the Language Service constitutes 12% of its total staff, and that interpreters
were used in 10,200 meetings, representing 115,000 interpreter days. Id. at 388, 1 1143.
173. In a new system introduced in January 1994, the Report of Cases before the
Court ofJustice (the ECR) no longer contain a Report of the Hearing in order to save
translation time and are accordingly appearing only with a three-month delay. Unfor-
tunately, most of the 1992 and 1993 judgment reports, to be issued under the prior
system, have yet to appear.
174. Commissioner van Miert, in charge of staff, estimated in July 1994 that the
Commission would need 300 new translators and 75 new interpreters to deal with Finn-
ish, Norwegian and Swedish. Comm'n Press Rel. IP (94) 676 (July 19, 1994), summarized
in Common Mkt. Rep. - New Dev. (CCH) 1 97504, at 53,528. Although these figures
will be reduced, because Norwegian will not be used, the Council, Parliament and the
Court of Justice will all have to augment their translation services as well.
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The prospect of further enlargement in the near future will
undoubtedly push this issue to the fore, perhaps even to formal
consideration at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. The
December 1993 Brussels European Council, which formally de-
cided that Finnish and Swedish should be added to the official
languages when it set most of the post-enlargement institutional
structure, added that the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference
should "consider any measures deemed necessary to facilitate
the work of the institutions and guarantee their effective opera-
tion,"175 perhaps an invitation to reconsider the use of all official
languages. Each of the potential new candidate States has its
own language, except for Greek-speaking Cyprus (but if Cyprus
can be reunified, it might well be obligated to add Turkish as an
official language because of its substantial Turkish minority). Is
it conceivable that a Union of twenty-five States in 2010 could
effectively function with, say, twenty-two official languages?
There can be no question but that legally-binding texts must
be translated accurately into the official languages of all the
Member States. In its 1992 report, "Europe and the Challenge
of Enlargement," the Commission concluded that "for reasons
of principle, legal acts and important documents should con-
tinue to be translated into the official languages of all Member
States." 17b Not only is it politically inconceivable that a State
could accept the binding force of legislation, international
agreements, court judgments, and administrative decisions writ-
ten in a foreign language, but the Court of Justice most likely
would consider it a matter of a fundamental right for states and
individuals to be bound only by texts in their official lan-
guages. 177 The Court of Justice may, of course, on occasion,
have to deal with conflicting language versions of the same legis-
lative texts, but it has precedents on how to confront this is-
sue. 1
78
175. 26 E.C. BuLL., no. 12, at 18 (1993).
176. Challenge of Enlargement, supra note 13, at 16.
177. Cf KAvrmN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 116, at 64.
178. The most famous example is Stauder v. City of Um, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R.
419, [1970] C.M.L.R. 112, in which the German version of a Commission agricultural
decision varied significantly from that of the decision in other languages. The Court
espoused a teleological mode of resolving the difference: "the necessity for uniform
application and accordingly for uniform interpretation makes it impossible to consider
one version of the text in isolation but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of
both the real intention of its author and the aim he seeks to achieve, in the light in
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The Union may, however, be obliged to take difficult deci-
sions on the limitation of some written material, and some oral
proceedings, to a limited number of languages in order to re-
duce costs and promote speed in operations. Although the most
important secondary material - annual general reports, the
monthly bulletin, and annual sectoral reports - merit transla-
tion in all languages, many of the other reports and studies
could be reasonably limited to a few languages. The same is true
of oral proceedings - while Council meetings and plenary ses-
sions of Parliament merit simultaneous translation, cannot most
other gatherings limit-the use of working languages?
Of course, the choice of working languages is a delicate
one. At least the United Nations' system of six working lan-
guages provides a precedent.'79 Could the Union limit itself to
English and French, which would be certainly the cheapest and
fastest mode of linguistic operations? Should the languages of
the five largest States be mandated? Should the language of the
State which holds the Council presidency be added as a working
language during that presidency? Should perhaps the language
of a couple of smaller states be added in rotation for a period of
time, along the lines of the rotation in advocates-general? Crea-
tive, but pragmatic solutions, will certainly be in demand if the
Union ever seriously grapples with this issue.
Having now completed our analytical review of the impact
of the 1995 enlargement on the institutional structure and oper-
ational modalities of the Union, we turn to a major constitu-
tional aspect, the application of the acquis communautaire prin-
ciple.
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE
A. Origin of the Principle in the First Enlargement
As indicated at the outset of this Article, all accessions of
particular of the versions in all four languages." Id. at 424, 13, [1970] C.M.L.R. at 118.
In its famous judgment encouraging national courts to make frequent referrals under
Article 177, Srl CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, Case 283/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3415, [1983] 1
C.M.L.R. 472, the Court observed that "Community legislation is drafted in several Ian-
guages and.., the different language versions are equally authentic. An interpretation
of a provision of Community law thus involves a comparison of the different language
versions." Id. at 3430, 18, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 491.
179. The U.N. working languages are Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian,
and Spanish.
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new Member States are governed by the principle of the acquis
communautaire. This term, so hard to translate that the French
is invariably used even in English texts, means essentially that the
intrinsic core of the Community (now the "Union") legal and
political structure is a given ("acquis") which the new Member
State must accept, not challenge or call into question.
The acquis communautaire principle has a highly pragmatic
origin. In 1969, the original six Member States were confronted
with the possible accession of four new ones (Norway had ap-
plied along with Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom,
which ultimately joined in 1973). An increase of two-thirds in
the voting membership of the Council and the Commission (at
the time, the Parliament's role was relatively unimportant)
might conceivably have lead to radical revisions in structure, op-
erations and policies. This the leaders of the initial six Member
States and of the Community institutions definitely did not want
to happen.
When in 1969 the Council asked the Commission to provide
a fresh opinion on the applications of the four candidate
states, 8 ' the Commission responded on October.1, 1969.181 The
Commission notably declared that the Community should not
"allow its unity to be impaired" and that "[tihe enlargement of
the Community ... must not be a brake on ... action" in pro-
gress in the ,agricultural, economic and monetary, social and
180. To understand the background of the first enlargement, one must remember
that Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom had all applied during May-
July 1967. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FiFTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE
AcTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 1971 8-9, 15 (1972) [hereinafter FIFTH REPORT]. The
Commission's initial Opinion of September 26, 1967, summarized at 1 16 of that Re-
port, was quite favorable. Id. at 9-10, 16. However, the Council meeting on Decem-
ber 18-19, 1967 could not reach agreement to open negotiations. Id. at 10-11, 17.
Although the Fifth Report does not say why this happened, the well-known reason was
the veto interposed by President De Gaulle. Later, when President De Gaulle resigned
and was succeeded by a great European statesman, President Pompidou, the veto was
lifted. Then, on July 22-23 1969, the Council asked the Commission to bring up to date
its two-year old opinion. Id. at 11, 18. A fascinating summary of this history, as well as
a description of President De Gaulle's veto of the 1961-63 attempt of the United King-
dom, Denmark, Ireland and Norway to join at that time, is contained in KAPTEYN &
VERLOREN vAN THEMAAT, supra note 116, at 17-20.
181. The Commission Opinion is published in French in E.C. BULL. no. 9/10 Sup-
plement (1969). It is summarized in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
THIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTvrriEs OF THE COMMUNITY 1969, at 333-34, 1 377
(1970) [hereinafter THIRD REPORT].
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other sectors.1 8 2 The Commission urged that
"[a] t the beginning of the negotiations... [the applicants]
will have to state their agreement not only with the principle
of accepting what has been attained by the Community - in
other words, the Treaties plus the decisions taken since these
came into force - but also in the full knowledge of the meas-
ures agreed on or in course of implementation .... with the
principle of strengthening the Community.""'
At the famous Hague Summit on December 1-2, 1969, the
Heads of Government and State endorsed this principle in a
more laconic form: "In so far as the applicant States accept the
Treaties and their political objective, the decisions taken since
the entry into force of the Treaties," the negotiations could com-
mence. 184 Thus, the principle of the acquis communautaire be-
came an authoritatively stated condition for the first enlarge-
ment and subsequently for any future accession.
On June 30, 1970, when negotiations with the applicants at
the ministerial level formally opened in Luxembourg, Foreign
Minister Harmel of Belgium, then President of the Council, de-
clared to the applicants that they must accept the Treaties, the
internal Community acts, and also "the agreements concluded
by the Community with third countries" (which meant notably
trade and association agreements and the GATT)-"5 Moreover,
he reviewed a number of on-going developments and proposals,
including the development of a Community system for its own
financial resources and the creation of an economic and mone-
tary union (!), noting that any Community decisions reached
during the negotiations must likewise be accepted by the appli-
cant States. 18 6 Finally, Mr. Harmel insisted that "the solution of
any problems of adjustment ... must be sought in . . . transi-
tional measures and not in changes of existing rules."18 7
To the satisfaction of the Commission and the Council, the
182. Id. at 334.
183. Id.
184. Final Communique of the Conference of Heads of State or Government on 1-
2 Dec. 1969 at the Hague, in THIRD REPORT, supra note 181, annex, at 189.
185. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTH GENERAL REPORT ON
THE AcTWTIES OF THE COMMUNITY 1970 260, 336 (1971) [hereinafter FOURTH RE-
PORT].
186. Id. at 257-59, It 331-34.
187. Id. at 260, 1 336.
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negotiations with the applicants were relatively rapid, nineteen
months, and reflected the acquis communautaire. Although a
significant number of transitional measures had to be laid down,
they did not alter existing Community rules and were generally
rather short in duration, usually not more than five years.1 88
The 1972 Act of Accession for Denmark, Ireland and the
United Kingdom began with Articles 2-4, by which the new
States accepted the Treaties, all institutional acts, all decisions,
agreements, declarations and resolutions of the Council and all
agreements or conventions entered into by any of the Communi-
ties, at the date of accession,January 1, 1973.89 Under Article 9,
the only exception was for derogations and transitional meas-
ures set out in the Act of Accession, which would usually termi-
nate at the end of 1977.190
Accordingly, the precedent then set for all future accessions
involved the initial acceptance by the applicants of the elements
of the acquis communautaire, followed by negotiations intended
to cover all the practical issues involved in adapting the appli-
cant states' legal regimes to that of the Community, and, finally,
the insertion of a limited, precise list of transitional measures,
with a definite time table for their lapse, into the act of acces-
sion.
Thus, at the time of the first enlargement in 1973, the ac-
quis communautaire could be analyzed as comprising six constit-
uent elements: 1) the Treaties, 2) the institutional structure
under the Treaties, 3) the legislation and other acts of the Com-
munity, 4) international agreements entered into by the Com-
munity, 5) legislation and other acts adopted during the negotia-
tions, and 6) the somewhat vague concept of the "political objec-
tive" of the Treaties.
Quite without fanfare, the Commission added a further ele-
ment to the acquis communautaire (the seventh in terms of the
prior analysis) in its requisite opinion of January 19, 1972, just
188. Fivr REPORT, supra note 180, at 20, 29 (1972).
189. 1972 Act of Accession, supra note 11, arts. 2-4,J.O. L 73/1, at 14-15 (1972).
190. Id. art. 9,J.O. L 73/1, at 15. The 1971 Fifth General Report set out the most
important transitional measures. FirrH REPORT, supra note 180, at 23-30, 11 34-47.
Probably the one with the greatest historical significance is paragraph 38 on fishing
rights. Id. at 26-27, 1 38. Because of the vital fishing interests of the new States, it
became imperative that the Community adopt a Common Fisheries Policy, scheduled
for 1978 in the accession treaty, but only finally adopted in 1983.
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before the Act of Accession was signed. This opinion first ob-
served that the applicant states had accepted the Treaties and
their political objectives, as well as all Community acts.1 91 Then,
in a final recital, the Commission declared that the "legal order"
of the ComMunity included the principles of the direct applica-
bility both of certain Treaty provisions and of certain legislation,
of the primacy of Community law over any conflicting national
provisions, and of the uniform interpretation of Community
law192 - all major doctrines developed by the Court ofJustice in
the early years of Community law. 1 3 The recital concluded with
the assertion that "accession implies recognition of the binding
nature of these rules, observance of which is indispensable to
guarantee the effectiveness and unity of Community law."' 94
Although this declaration does not figure in the 1972 Act of
Accession, it may be regarded as an authentic further aspect of
the acquis communautaire principle. In this connection, it is
worthy of note that Article 3 of the U.K. European Communities
Act of 1972 stated that issues arising in the interpretation of the
Treaties or any Community act should be referred to the Court
of Justice or determined in accordance with prior decisions of
the Court.1 95
In the famous Factortame case, 196 the Court of Justice de-
clared that U.K. courts must regard themselves as possessing the
191. Opinion of the Commission of January 19, 1972 on the Applications for Ac-
cession of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom, fifth
recital, J.O. L. 73/3 (1972) [hereinafter Opinion of the Commission].
192. Id. sixth recital.
193. The Court of Justice first stated the doctrine of the direct applicability (or
direct effect, as it is better known) of certain precisely worded and absolute articles of
the EEC Treaty in Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/
62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105, and the doctrine of the primacy of Treaty
provisions over conflicting national law in Costa v. Ente Nazionale per L'Energia Elletrica
(ENEL), Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425. An analysis of the rich
development of these doctrines is beyond the scope of this article. For such an analysis,
see BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra note 28, ch. 5, at 166-203; KAPTEYN &
VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 116, at 38-40, § 2.2; SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK,
supra note 162, at 115-54, §§ 201-63.
194. Opinion of the Commission, supra note 191, sixth recital, J.O. 73/3 (1972).
195. European Communities Act of 1972, ch. 68 (U.K.).
196. The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., Case
C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R..1. For a further discussion, seeJayJ.
Aragon&s, Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport Ex Parte Factortame Ltd.: The Limits of
Parliamentaiy Sovereignty and the Rule of Community Law, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 778
(1990-91).
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judicial power to restrain the effect of an Act of Parliament
pending a final determination of whether the Act contravenes a
principle of Community law. When the House of Lords abided
by this guidance from the Court, Lord Bridge of Harwich re-
marked in his opinion:
"Some public comments on the [Court of Justice's] deci-
sion [in Factortame] .. .have suggested that this was a novel
and dangerous invasion by a Community institution of the
sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. But such
comments are based on a misconception. If the supremacy
... of Community law over the national law of Member States
was not always inherent in the EEC Treaty, it was certainly
well established in the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined the Com-
munity. Under the terms of the [European Communities]
Act of 1972 it has always been clear that it was the duty of a
United Kingdom court, when delivering final judgment, to
override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with
any directly enforceable rule of Community law." 197
Lord Bridge's powerfully stated opinion substantiates the
view that even at the time of the first enlargement, the acquis
communautaire principle could be considered to include the
fundamental doctrines of Community law articulated by the
Court of Justice, in addition to the elements previously dis-
cussed. Inasmuch as the Court ofJustice doctrines on these mat-
ters, as well as its case law on the interpretation and scope of the
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, 19 8 have
profoundly shaped Community law, the inclusion of authorita-
tive Court precedents in the acquis communautaire is no small
matter.
B. The Mediterranean Enlargement: The Acquis Communautaire
Principle Expands
In the mid-1970's, as Greece, Portugal and Spain repudi-
ated their prior totalitarian regimes and installed popularly-
elected governments with democratic constitutions, they quite
197. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., [1991] 1
All ER 70, 107-08 (H.L.), [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 375, 379-80 (H.L. Oct. 11, 1990).
198. A description of this rich case law is beyond the scope of this Article. For an
analysis, see BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra note 28, chs. 9-17, at 317-625;
KArEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 116, ch. VII, at 355-466.
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naturally turned their eyes to the success of the European Com-
munity, both in political and economic terms. The fledgling
democratic states were keen both to participate in the economic
achievements of the common market and to become a part of
the stable political club of its members. On June 12, 1975, Presi-
dent Karamanlis of Greece submitted its application for acces-
sion, followed on March 28, 1977, by that of Prime Minister
Soares of Portugal, and on July 28, 1977 by the application of
Prime Minister Suarez of Spain. 199
In each case, the Commission gave a favorable opinion, and
each opinion stressed the political implications of accession. In
applying for Greece, President Karamanlis had emphasized that
"[o]ur request is inspired primarily by political considerations
... which focus on consolidating our democracy and the future
of our country."200 In response, the January 28, 1976 Commis-
sion opinion on Greece observed that "the consolidation of de-
mocracy in Greece, which is a fundamental concern not only of
the Greek people but also of the Community" intimately related
to the application. 20 ' The Commission's May 19, 1978 opinion
on Portugal likewise linked accession to the firm reestablishment
of democracy in that country,20 2 and the subsequent November
29, 1978 opinion on Spain made the same point.203
This linkage of a firm adherence to democratic principles
with membership in the Community has given rise to a new as-
pect of the acquis communautaire principle. The European
Council, at its April 7-8 1978 meeting in Copenhagen issued one
of its most powerful and compelling statements of basic policy,
the Declaration on Democracy.20 4 The European Council took
the occasion of fixing the date (June 1979) for the first direct
199. The respective applications are described in 8 E.C. BULL. no. 6, at 11-13
(1975) (Greece); 10 E.C. BULL., no. 3, at 8-10 (1977) (Portugal); 10 E.C. BULL., no. 7/8,
at 6-7 (1977) (Spain).
200. 8 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 11, 1203 (1975).
201. 9 E.C. BULL., no. 1, at 6 (1976). The full opinion is contained in 9 E.C. BULL.,
no. 2, supp. (1976).
202. 11 E.C. BULL., no. 5, at 8 (1978). Prime Minister Soares stated that member-
ship in the Community represented "the guarantee of Portugal's turn to democracy."
Id.
203. 11 E.C. BULL., no. 11, at 7 (1978). The Commission seized the occasion of
the Spanish application to produce three studies, called the General Considerations on
the Problems of Enlargement ("Fresco"), published in 11 E.C. BULL., nos. 1-3, supp.
(1978).
204. 11 E.C. BULL., no. 3, at 5-6 (1978).
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election of Parliament to make the statement. The Declaration
on Democracy expresses the following major principles:
The Heads of State and of Government confirm their
will... to safeguard the principles of representative democ-
racy, of the rule of law, of social justice and of respect for
human rights.
The application of these principles implies a political sys-
tem of pluralist democracy which guarantees both the free
expression of opinions ... and the procedures necessary for
the protection of human rights....
They solemnly declare that respect for and maintenance
of representative democracy and human rights in each Mem-
ber State are essential elements of membership ....
The issuance of this Declaration, with the express language
on "representative democracy" as a condition of membership,
precisely at the time of the applications of Greece, Portugal and
Spain was plainly not a coincidence. The Member State leaders
intended the applicant states to realize that their new commit-
ment to democracy must be irrevocable if they were to become
Member States.
That this condition now constituted a part of the acquis
communautaire became clear in the final Commission opinion
of May 23, 1979, endorsing the accession of Greece, and that of
May 31, 1985, endorsing that of Portugal and Spain. In both,
the Commission added a seventh recital, which had not figured
in its opinion on the occasion of the first enlargement. This re-
cital declared:
Whereas the principles of pluralist democracy and respect for
human rights form part of the common heritage of the peo-
ples.., in the European Communities and are therefore es-
sential elements of membership ....26
Not only does the acquis communautaire now include the
respect for pluralist democracy and human rights, but the Medi-
terranean enlargement served to emphasis another aspect of the
205. Id. at 6.
206. Commission Opinion of 23 May 1979 on the Application for Accession to the
European Communities by the Hellenic Republic, O.J. L 291/3, at 3 (1979); see Com-
mission Opinion of 31 May 1985 on the Applications for Accession to the European
Communities by the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, O.J. L 302/3, at 3
(1985) (containing similar language); see also Bernhard Schloh, The Accession of Greece to
the European Economic Communities, 10 GEORGIAJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 385, 394-95 (1980).
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acquis, already present in the first enlargement but become
much more important in later years. This is the obligation
which already figured in Article 3(3) of the 1972 Act of Acces-
sion 20 7 and was likewise included in the same article in the
Greek, Portuguese and Spanish Acts of Accession, namely the
obligation to be bound by "declarations or resolutions... con-
cerning the European Communities adopted by common agree-
ment of the Member States," to observe any "principles and
guidelines" derived therefrom, and to "take such measures as
may be necessary to ensure their implementation." °2 0
This obligation manifestly refers to the policy declarations
and decisions taken by the European Council, declarations and
decisions which had not only multiplied greatly in number over
the 1970's and early 1980's, but also represented some of the
most important decisions on Community issues, e.g., on the es-
tablishment of a system of financial resources of the Community,
or on the direct election of the Parliament.20 9 Presumably this
reference also included the program of foreign policy coordina-
tion, begun by the European Council in the late 1970's, and for-
malized through Title II of the Single European Act.21 0 Apart
from the Declaration on Democracy, undoubtedly the most sig-
nificant Declaration thus implicitly subscribed to by Portugal
and Spain (Greece was already a member) was the Solemn Dec-
laration on European Union adopted by the Stuugart European
Council on June 1983.21 1 This Declaration represented the most
concrete commitment of Member State leaders to further steps
toward a political union.
The negotiations with Greece took about two and a half
years (July 27, 1976 to April 4, 1979), longer than those in the
first enlargement, but not unusually protracted in view of the
207. 1972 Act of Accession, supra note 11, art. 3(3),J.O. L 73/3, at 14 (1972).
208. Act of Accession for Greece, supra note 12, art. 3(3), O.J. L 191/17, at 17(1979); Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal, supra note 12, art. 3(3), O.J. L 302/23,
at 23 (1985).
209. For these and other important policy decisions taken by the European Coun-
cil in the 1970's and early 1980's, see BULMER & WESSELS, supra note 134, at 59-74.
210. See supra note 2. In June 1977, the European Council's London Declaration
on the European Council stated that the meetings would also be used to provide a
.concerted Community opinion on a topic of international concern." 10 E.C. BULL.,
no. 6, at 83 (1977). For a description and analysis of such foreign policy coordination,
see EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION IN THE 1980s: A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR
WESTERN EUROPE? (A. Pjpers, E. Regelsberger & W. Wessels, eds. 1988).
211. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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many transitional arrangements required for Greece. In con-
trast, the negotiations with Portugal and Spain consumed six
and a half years, ending on March 29, 1985. Toward the middle
of the negotiations, the Commission prepared a new report,
"Problems of Enlargement," which concentrated on the height-
ened problems posed by a serious economic recession in both
Portugal and Spain.212 Despite these new difficulties, the Com-
mission urged that "the idea of considering adoption of only
part of the acquis communautaire" should be rejected.1 3 The
Commission instead proposed longer transitional periods, the
solution ultimately adopted.214
Accordingly, the Act of Accession of Greece and the Act of
Accession for Portugal and Spain both commenced with Articles
2-4, by which the new States formally accepted the Treaties, the
institutional structure, the legislative and other acts to date, in-
ternational agreements, and the declarations and decisions of
the Council and European Council.2 15 Added to this, as noted
before, the Commission opinions included Court of Justice doc-
trines and a respect for pluralist democracy and human rights as
ingredients of the acquis communautaire.
A final interesting note is that Portugal and Spain were im-
plicitly deemed to accept the Single European Act amendments
to the Treaties, even though not yet ratified by any existing State.
The Act of Accession and related Treaties were signed on June
12, 1985, to become effective January, 1, 1986,16 while the Lux-
embourg Intergovernmental Conference which drafted the Sin-
gle European Act worked in the Fall of 1985.217 Although the
212. 15 E.C. BuLL., no. 8, supp. (1982).
213. Id. at 7.
214. For example, Greece was allowed five years to phase in the Community ex-
change control rules for capital and seven years to adapt to some aspects of the Com-
mon Agricultural Polity, while Greek workers and their families would enjoy the full
right of free movement throughout the Community only after seven years. See 12 E.C.
BuLL., no. 5, at 11-14 (1979) (summarizing transitional measures). With regard to Por-
tugal and Spain, aspects of the phase-in of the Common Agricultural Policy and the
Common Fisheries Policy were set for ten years, and Portuguese and Spanish workers
and their families would enjoy complete freedom of movement only after seven years.
See 18 E.C. BuLL., no. 3, at 7-9 (1985) (summarizing these arrangements).
215. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
216. 18 E.C. BuLL., no. 6, at 7 (1985).
217. The Luxembourg conference convened on September 9, 1985. 18 E.C.
BuLL., no. 9, at 7 (1985). It concluded on December 17, 1985. 18 E.C. BuLL., no. 12, at
11 (1985).
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"rules of the game" for Community decision-making were thus
significantly altered in the last few months before Spain and Por-
tugal joined, neither State occasioned any difficulties in the pro-
cess of ratification of the Single European Act, which eventually
entered into effect on July 1, 1987.218
Thus, the Mediterranean enlargement of the Community
reveals a significant expansion of the basic principle of the ac-
quis communautaire. Most important is the addition of the re-
spect for pluralist democracy and human rights, expressed in the
Copenhagen Declaration of Democracy. This enlargement re-
flects also a heightened degree of acceptance of declarations
and decisions of the European Council, and of the acceptance of
on-going decisions up to the date of accession, notably the modi-
fications produced by the Single European Act.
C. The Acquis Communautaire Principle Assumes Legal and
Constitutional Dimensions
At the time of the first enlargement and of the Mediterra-
nean enlargement, the acquis communautaire may be said to
have been essentially political in character. The existing Mem-
ber State leadership together with the Community institutions
demanded that applicant states agree that accession negotiations
be based upon the full acceptance of the principle's constituent
elements. Once the principle's aspects were inserted into Arti-
cles 2-4 of the Acts of Accession they became, of course, legally
binding, with temporary exceptions permitted only if embodied
in transitional derogations.
The Court of Justice has strictly applied the rule that the
new Member States totally accept the institutional structure, op-
erations and Community acts in a number of cases, tending to
read somewhat narrowly the scope of transitional derogations.219
218. See supra note 2. Portugal and Spain both ratified the SEA in December 1986.
TWENTIETH REPORT, supra note 152, at 34, 1 1. Ratification of the SEA was intended to
end in time to allow the SEA to take effect on January 1, 1987, but was delayed by a
referendum in Ireland in May 1987 in order to approve constitutional amendments,
after the Irish Supreme Court required this action. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES, XXIsT GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcrVmES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
1987, at 29, 1 (1988).
219. See, e.g., Commission v. Greece, Case 58/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2027, [1986] 1
C.M.L.R. 673 (reading strictly the derogation for exchange controls); Commission v.
Greece, Case 192/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3967, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 420 (forbidding Greece to
provide financial incentives for purchase of Greek agricultural equipment in absence of
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Probably the best example of the Court's doctrinal approach is
to be found in Spain v. Council, a 1988 judgment concerning
Spain's challenge of a Council regulation modifying the dairy
production quota allocated to Spain at the time of accession.2"'
The Council regulation was adopted on May 6, 1986, only five
months after the accession treaty entered into force. Although
the Act of Accession stated a number of derogations to the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy, it did not specifically guarantee that
Spain's dairy production would not be adversely altered during
any period of time. Spain nonetheless argued vigorously that
the Council reduction of the Spanish dairy production quota was
illegal.
Spain's initial contention was that the Council action had
not been validly adopted because Spain had not voted in favor.
Spain argued that the quotas constituted a condition of "an
agreement between the Member States and the states seeking
membership which could not be amended without the consent
of all the contracting parties."
2 2 1
The Court rejected this view. Instead, the Court pointed to
Article 8 in the general principles of the Act of Accession which
noted that any amendment made by the Act to any Community
measure (in this case, the regulation governing dairy quotas)
would "have the same status in law as the provisions which they
repeal or amend and shall be subject to the same rules as those
provisions."222 In other words, the Court treated Article 8 as per-
mitting the Council to amend the Act's quota provision by the
same qualified majority vote as required for any other agricul-
tural legislation. 2 Spain was subject to the legislative rulemak-
ing procedure in the EEC Treaty just as any other State was sub-
ject to that procedure, no more, no less. Presumably the Court
any derogation on subject). The Commission and Member States are also bound to
apply strictly the transition provisions. See, e.g., Peskegloglou v. Bundesanstalt fur
Arbeit, Case 77/82, [1983] E.C.R. 1085; [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 381 (Germany cannot intro-
duce new restrictions on Greek migrant labor); Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission, Case 11/
82, [1985] E.C.R. 207; [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 461 (Commission cannot take emergency
protection measures against Greek textiles even if foreseen by Act of Accession without
balanced review of impact upon both complaining Member States and Greek producers
of textiles).
220. Case 203/86, [1988] E.C.R. 4563.
221. Id. at 4598, 4.
222. Act of Accession for Spain and Portugal, supra note 12, art. 8, O.J. 302/23, at
24 (1985).
223. Spain v. Council, [1988] E.C.R. at 4598, 1 5-7.
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could have accepted Spain's argument if the Act of Accession's
derogation had quite precisely stated that the Spanish dairy
quota could not be altered for a stated period of time (say, five
years) - but note that the derogation would have to be limited
in time in order not to violate the acquis communautaire princi-
ple.
Spain also argued that the Council's action violated the
principle of legitimate expectations, an administrative law princi-
ple with basic rights overtones which the Court of Justice has on
occasion safeguarded. The Court in .this case refused to apply
the principle of legitimate expectations, observing that constant
readjustments had to be made in view of "the variations of the
economic situations in the various agricultural sectors."224 The
fact that Spain's dairy quota was specifically set in the Act of Ac-
cession did not bring the principle of legitimate expectations
into play, because once again, Article 8 of the Act clearly stated
that Community institutions might amend again any Community
act which was amended by the Act of Accession. 2 5
Although one may have a certain sympathy for Spain, which
may well have felt that it had been somewhat misled by the inser-
tion of a quota in the Act only to have it so swiftly reduced, the
Court read strictly the derogation and broadly the inherent
power of freedom of institutional action, a basic aspect of the
acquis communautaire. In other cases, the Court has also in-
sisted that new Member States are fully bound by the duty of
loyalty expressed in Article 5 of the EC Treaty, so that they must
honestly and carefully abide by the limits set in such deroga-
tions.226
Potentially even more significant than the Court's interpre-
tation of acts of accession in the light of the acquis, com-
munautaire principle is the introduction of the principle itself
into the "constitutional charter,"227 the Maastricht Treaty itself.
224. Id. at 4601, 19.
225. Id. at 4601, 20.
226. Commission v. Greece, Case 192/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3967, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R.
420.
227. The Court ofJustice first referred to the Treaties as constituting a "constitu-
tional charter" in Patti dcologiste 'Ls Verts' v. Parliament, Case 294/83, [1986] E.C.R.
1339, 1365, 1 23, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 343, 371, and expanded upon this in paragraph 21
of the famous Opinion 1/91 on the European Economic Area Agreement, [1991]
E.C.R. -, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 245 (Eur. CLJ. Dec. 14, 1991). The term obviously now
applies to the Maastricht Treaty.
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The term figures in two initial articles of Title I, the Common
Provisions.
Article B sets forth the objectives of the Union, notably an
internal market, an economic and monetary union, a common
foreign and security policy, promotion of the rights of citizens of
the Union, and cooperation on justice and home affairs. The
final objective listed is:
to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it
with a view to considering, through the procedure referred to
in Article N(2), to what extent the policies and forms of coop-
eration introduced by this Treaty may need to be revised with
the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and
the institutions of the Community.22 8
In addition, the first paragraph of Article C states:
The Union shall be served by a single institutional frame-
work which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of
the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while
respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire.2
Why are these two references made to the acquis com-
munautaire and what is their constitutional impact? In neither
case is the answer obvious, and the full sense of the provisions
may only become clear over a period of time.
In setting the agenda of topics for the Intergovernmental
Conferences at Rome, the December 1990 European Council
had made clear that structural modifications or expansions in
scope should build on the existing institutions and scope. 3 °
The Luxembourg European Council, meeting in June 1991 at
the mid-point of the Intergovernmental Conferences, gave the
same guidance: "full maintenance of the acquis communautaire
and development thereof, a single institutional framework with
procedures appropriate to the requirements of the various
spheres of action."
2 11
It would seem reasonable to interpret the references to
228. TEU, supra note 7, art. B.
229. Id. art. C, 1.
230. 23 E.C. BuLL., no. 12, at 9-11 (1990).
231. 24 E.C. BuLL., no. 6, at 9 (1991). The European Council thus largely en-
dorsed the approach of the June 18, 1991 Luxembourg Presidency draft, whose Articles
B and C contained earlier formulations of the present Maastricht Treaty text. See RICH-
ARD CORBETT, THE TREAvW OF MAASTRICHT FROM CONCEPTION TO RATIFICATION: A COM-
PREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE 37-38, 293 (1993).
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maintaining in full, and to respecting and building upon the ac-
quis communautaire, as a strong admonition that future changes
should not be retrograde in character, should not, for example,
reduce the role of the Parliament or increase the veto power of
Member States in specific types of decision-making. Rather
"building upon" probably implies an increase in the democratic
character and modes of efficient operations, both major topics
for action at the Rome Intergovernmental Conference.
The stress on the "single institutional structure" in Article C
to be used in future "building upon" the acquis communautaire
might well be linked with the suggested use of the Article N
amendment procedure to revise "the policies and forms of coop-
eration" introduced by the Treaty. This is surely more than a
hint that the second and third pillars, the Common Foreign and
Security Policy and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs,
should be integrated into the normal institutional structure in
the future. This, of course, would mean a serious participation
by the Commission and Parliament in decision-making, and a
right of review by the Court of Justice (presently excluded by
Article L of the TEU).
More speculatively, the references to the acquis com-
munautaire in Articles B and C may have implications for future
enlargements. As the Union grows to twenty, or twenty-five, or
perhaps even thirty states, structural modifications in the institu-
tions will have to be made in order to prevent debilitating ineffi-
ciency. It may be that the acquis communautaire concept will be
invoked not only to support furtherance of democratic princi-
ples (lower voting majorities in the Council, increased powers
for the Parliament, enhancement of the authority of the Court
of Justice in challenges by national supreme courts), but also to
frustrate proposals of two-tier or multiple-tier approaches to
Union policies and programs, or to counter requests by States
for new opt-out rights for specific fields of Union action.232
232. See the reflections of Professor Paul Demaret on how far "opt-out provisions"
and "variable geometry" may be compatible with the acquis communautaire in "The
Treaty Framework," the first chapter in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 8-10
(David O'Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1994).
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D. The Acquis Communautaire Principle Expands Further in the
1995 Enlargement
As it had before the earlier accessions, the Commission con-
sistently insisted that the negotiations with and the admission of
Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden should be based upon the
principle of the acquis communautaire. In its report, "Europe
and the Challenge of Enlargement," the Commission pro-
claimed at once that "widening must not be at the expense of
deepening. Enlargement must not be a dilution of the Commu-
nity's achievements."'" 3
The European Council agreed with the basic premise that
deepening came first - as observed earlier, the formal negotia-
tions with the applicants were delayed by the Edinburgh Euro-
pean Council until after the entry into force of the Maastricht
Treaty.2 14 This is the major innovation in the scope of the acquis
communautaire for the 1995 enlargement. The principle now
includes the stages in progress toward an Economic and Mone-
tary Union, Cooperation in Foreign and Security Policy, and Co-
ordination in Justice and Home Affairs. The Commission
stressed these new features of the acquis in its report, as well as
the respect for democracy and basic human rights which is now
a formal part of the TEU, expressed in Article F.235
Moreover, the Commission added another novel criterion:
"a functioning and competitive market economy, and an ade-
quate legal and administrative framework in the public and pri-
vate sectors."23 6 This new feature, never before declared a part
of the acquis, is a fairly natural consequence of a principle stated
in the new Article 3a added to the EC Treaty by the Maastricht
Treaty. Article 3a declares that the economic policies of Mem-
ber States as well as those of the Community must be "conducted
in accordance with the principle of an open market economy
with free competition."2 7
Although Finland and Sweden have traditionally had gov-
ernments with strong socialist features and large scale public
233. Challenge of Enlargement, supra note 13, at 10.
234. See supra note 94.
235. Challenge ofEnlargement, supra note 13, at 11-13; see also Booss & Forman, supra
note 1, at 100-02.
236. Id. at 11.
237. TEU, supra note 7, art. G; EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 3a (added by TEU).
1995] 1155
1156 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1092
ownership in the private sector, the Commission's opinions on
each one's application concluded fairly readily that each country
satisfied the free market economy precondition.2 38 The Com-
mission's 1992 report on the challenge of enlargement actually
focussed as much on the prospects of future accession requests
from central European states as on those from Austria, Finland
and Sweden. Satisfaction of the new condition of a "functioning
and competitive market economy" may yet prove difficult for
some of the central European aspirants to Union membership
(see Section V(B)).
Although the Commission had expressed considerable con-
cern that Austria, Finland and Sweden might not want to fully
accept participation in the Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy, especially any common defense aspects, because of their
traditional neutralist foreign policy attitudes, 39 in fact this never
proved a serious issue in the negotiations. Likewise, Denmark's
opt-out of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union
might have incited some resistance by the applicants to that new
aspect of the acquis.. Again, this did not occur. The Council
noted with satisfaction in March 1994 that "the applicant coun-
tries undertook to accept the entire acquis communautaire, in-
cluding the Treaty on European Union with no opt-outs,
although technical adaptations were made or transitional peri-
ods were granted in some areas. "240
The Act of Accession for Austria, Finland and Sweden con-
tained the same general principles in Articles 2-10 in virtually
identical language to that used in the Mediterranean enlarge-
ment act of accession, except for a new Article 3 on the accept-
ance of "conventions or instruments in the field of justice and
home affairs."241 The final Commission Opinion of April 19,
1994, reproduced in virtually identical terms the references to
the basic Court of Justice doctrines and the respect for democ-
racy and human rights as essential components of the acquis
238. Commission Opinion on Finland's Application for Membership, 25 E.C.
BUL.., no. 6, supp., at 25; Commission Opinion on Sweden's Application for Member-
ship, 25 E.C. BULL., no. 5, supp., at 9-10, 20-21.
239. See Challenge of Enlargement, supra note 13, at 13 (emphasizing that "binding
assurances will be sought [from applicants] with regard to their political commitment
and legal capacity to fulfil their obligations").
240. 27 E.C. BULL., no. 3, at 64 (1994).




A rather interesting point is whether the acquis com-
munautaire now includes the Maastricht Social Protocol and the
annexed Agreement on Social Policy. Because the United King-
dom does not participate in the legislative machinery for adopt-
ing social legislation under the Protocol, nor is such legislation
binding on the United Kingdom, it might be argued that this is
outside a common and fully accepted acquis communautaire.
The applicant states are, however, long committed to strong
social protection policies and had no objection to the Social Pro-
tocol or its machinery. By an indirect reference, it is apparent
that the applicant states are bound by the Social Protocol. Arti-
cle 15(4) of the Act of Accession (as modified by the January 1,
1995 Council Decision) revises the qualified majority vote figure
set in the Social Protocol for all the Member States except for
the United Kingdom, in order to take into account the weighted
votes of the three new States. 43
IV. THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN THE
1995 ENLARGEMENT ,
Quite apart from knowing how the institutional structure of
the European Union has been modified to include Austria, Fin-
land and Sweden, the procedure through which they joined the
Union is of considerable interest. Such a procedure represents
an inherent mix of policy and political considerations, each of
which is quite important.
The founders of the European Economic Community never
intended it to be an exclusive club. Not only did they feel keen
disappointment that the United Kingdom did not join in the
venture, but they hoped and indeed anticipated that other Euro-
pean States would later decide to join the Community. For this
purpose, Article 237 was introduced into the Treaty of Rome. 44
This article governed the process involved in the first and sec-
ond enlargements, but was replaced by Article 0 of the Maas-
242. Commission Opinion of 19 April 1994, supra note 112, O.J. L 241/3 (1994).
243. 1994 Act of Accession, supra note 125, art. 15(4), O.J. L 241/21, at 24 (1994),
as modified by Council Decision of I January 1995, supra note 126, art. 8, O.J. L 1/1, at 4-
5 (1995).
244. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 237. This article was amended by the Single
European Act in 1987 to require the assent of Parliament to the accession of a new
state, but not otherwise modified. SEA. supra note 2, art. 8.
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tricht Treaty for the 1995 enlargement. Article 0 reads as fol-
lows:
Any European State may apply to become a Member of
the Union. It shall address its application to the Council,
which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission
and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament,
which shall act by an absolute majority of its component
members.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the
Treaties on which the Union is founded which such admis-
sion entails shall be the subject of an agreement between the
Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall
be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in
accordance with their respective constitutional require-
ments.
2 45
The only substantive difference between Article 0 and the
prior Article 237 is that an applicant now accedes to the Euro-
pean Union, rather than the Community. This in turn means
that the applicant must participate in the two unique features of
the Union, which are not part of the Community structure,
namely, Article J on the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
and Article K on Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. As
discussed in Section III(D), these two features of the Union are
now fundamental aspects of the acquis communautaire. There
is no suggestion in Article 0 that an applicant may be allowed to
opt out of either Article J or Article K. Article 0 does not au-
thorize any form of "two-tiered" Union.
Although we have mentioned in prior sections some of the
stages of the procedure leading up to the 1995 enlargement,
Section IV examines each phase in detail.
A. The Applications and the Commission Opinions
As noted before, Foreign Minister Mock of Austria filed its
formal application to join the European Community on July 17,
1989, and Prime Minister Carlsson filed the Swedish application
on July 1, 1991.46 In 1992, came those of Prime Minister Aho of
245. TEU, supra note 7, art. 0. Note that if any controversy should arise concern-
ing the interpretation or application of Article 0, Article L enables the issue to be
resolved by the Court ofJustice.
246. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing Austria's filing); supra
note 25 and accompanying text (discussing Sweden's filing).
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Finland on March 18 and Prime Minister Brunddand of Norway
on November 25.247 Although the applications of Austria, Fin-
land and Sweden reflected a broad consensus of the government
leaders and the political parties in parliament, this was not the
case in Norway. Not only did polls indicate that the level of pop-
ular support for accession was low, but also both the Norwegian
parliament and political leaders were divided on the advisability
of joining the supranational structures of the Community.248
From the outset it appeared inevitable that accession would
prove a difficult goal to achieve for Norway.
In all four cases, the Council received the applications and
requested the Commission for its opinion. We have mentioned
several times the Commission's important report, "Europe and
the Challenge of Enlargement," which served as a general tour di
horizon for the June 1992 Lisbon European Council. This report
specified that future Member States must meet two important
preconditions, namely, adherence to democratic principles and
respect for human rights, and the possession of a "functioning
and competitive market economy."249 We have already noted in
Section III(D) that the Commission concluded that all four ap-
plicants satisfied both of these indispensable conditions.
The Commission's opinion on the application of the first
candidate, Austria, was provided to the Council on July 31,
1991.250 At this juncture, the Rome Intergovernmental Confer-
ences were still laboring to elaborate the drafts for the Maas-
tricht Treaty, and the legislative program to complete the inter-
nal market by the end of 1992 was far from finished. The Com-
mission accordingly urged that no negotiations be opened with
Austria until 1993,251 a position subsequently endorsed by the
Lisbon European Council.
On the merits of Austria's bid, the Commission's view was
highly favorable. All Commission opinions on applications cover
both political and economic factors. On the political side, Aus-
247. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing Finland's filing); supra
note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Norway's filing).
248. See Norway Facing Stormy Debate Over Membership in Community, EUROWATCH,
Feb. 24, 1992, at 6; Norway Moves Steadily Toward EC, But Voter Skepticism Said to Be Up,
EUROWATCH Nov. 2, 1992, at 6, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurwch File.
249. Challenge of Enlargement, supra note 13, at 11; see supra notes 235-38.
250. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 4, supp. (1992), summarized in 24 E.C. BULL., no. 7/8, at 80-
81 (1991).
251. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 4, supp., at 5 (1992).
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tria's democratic government structures were certainly stable,
but its traditional neutral posture in foreign affairs posed a seri-
ous issue, particularly since Austria's 1955 Constitution man-
dated such a neutral status.252 The Soviet Union, then governed
by President Khrushchev, had made Austrian neutrality an indis-
pensable condition for the withdrawal of its occupation forces
and its consent to the unification of the country. However, the
Commission foresaw a good possibility of devising arrangements
to solve this issue, either by a "redefinition by Austria of its neu-
tral status" (assuming that the Soviet Union, governed in 1991 by
President Gorbachev, would accept the redefinition), or a dero-
gation for Austria on this matter.253
With regard to the economic factors, the Commission felt
that after it joined, Austria would be among those states that are
"the most stable and the strongest economically in the Commu-
nity."2 4 The Commission further observed that Austria had al-
ready manifested its willingness in the European Economic Area
to modify much of its legislation to accord with that in the inter-
nal market program. The only topics likely to engender difficult
negotiations would be agriculture and transport, the latter be-
cause of Austria's strict environmental protection rules gov-
erning trans-alpine rail and road traffic. 55
By July 31, 1992, the date of the Commission's favorable
opinion on Sweden's application, 56 the June 1992 Lisbon Euro-
pean Council had authorized the start of the accession process,
but only formally after the entry into force of the Maastricht
Treaty.257 Accordingly, the Commission did not repeat the view
expressed in the Austrian opinion that accession would have to
be delayed. In its review of political aspects, the Commission
emphasized Sweden's "democratic traditions and human rights
252. Id. at 15. For a historical presentation and pessimistic analysis of Austria's
neutral status as an issue in. its application, see David Kennedy & Leo Specht, Austria
and the European Communities, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 615 (1989). For a more optimis-
tic analysis, see Paul lansing & Paul Bye, New Membership and the Future of the European
Community, 15J. WORLD COMP. L. REv. 59, at 62-64 (1992)..
253. Id. at 17.
254. Id. at 8.
255. Id. at 12-14.
256. 25 E.C. BULL., no. 5, supp. (1992), summarized in 25 E.C. BULL., no. 7/8, at 74
(1992).
257. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
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record." 5 8 The Commission believed Sweden would have no
difficulty in participating fully in the Maastricht Treaty's Cooper-
ation in Justice and Home Affairs. 59 However, the Commission
considered that Sweden's traditional neutralist posture in for-
eign affairs did constitute a potentially important issue.
Although the Swedish government expressed a Willingness to
modify this policy, the Commission felt that "specific and bind-
ing assurances" might be needed to ensure Sweden's appropri-
ate participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy.2 60
On the economic side, the Commission foresaw no serious
difficulties. The Commission viewed Sweden's strong and
healthy economy as capable of making a significant contribution
to the Community, especially in movement towards an Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union.2 6 1 The Commission did remark
that the negotiations would have to confront serious issues in the
areas of agriculture, fisheries, regional aid, and taxation.2 62
The'Commission's favorable opinion on Finland came on
November 4, 1992.263 In reviewing political factors, the Commis-
sion observed that Finland's "geopolitical situation" (with Russia
as its neighbor) had obliged it to follow a policy of neutrality
throughout the Cold War era that only now could be modi-
fied .2  The Commission also noted that the Finnish govern-
ment was motivated by "reasons . . .not solely of an economic
nature" in making its application.2 65  The Commission con-
cluded that Finland shared with Community states the requisite
"values of democracy, human rights and market economy. "266
With regard to Finnish participation in the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, however, the Commission struck a cautious
note. The Commission concluded that Finnish neutrality in for-
eign affairs had been determined by past geopolitical concerns
and that its current government had genuinely moved to aban-
258. 25 E.C. BuLL., no. 5, supp., at 20 (1992).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 21.
261. Id. at 8-11.
262. Id. at 11-16.
263. 25 E.G. BuLL., no. 6, supp. (1992), summarized in 25 E.G. BuLL., no. 11, at 76
(1992).
264. 25 E.C. BuLL., no. 6, supp., at 7 (1992).
265. Id. at 8.
266. Id. at 25.
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don this posture,267 but that, like Sweden, Finland might have to
provide "specific and binding assurances" to this effect. 268
On the economic side, the Commission's evaluation
pointed to a number of serious problems, notably high levels of
unemployment and public spending. The Commission warned
that the Finnish government must energetically confront these
problems, which would otherwise pose difficult issues in moving
toward Finnish participation in the EMU.269 In addition, the
Commission cited agriculture, fisheries, regional aid, taxation
and competition as all raising issues that would have to be tack-
led in the negotiations. 270 Nonetheless, on balance the Commis-
sion concluded that accession "should not pose insuperable
problems of an economic nature."271
Norway's application came late, on November 25, 1992, so
that the Commission had to work rapidly to provide its opinion
on March 24, 1993.272 On the political side, Norway's stable
democratic government made it easy for the Commission to find
it an acceptable candidate. As a founding member of NATO,
Norwegian participation in the Common Foreign and Security
Policy appeared much easier to attain than would be the case for
the other applicants. 273
The Commission further found that "the Norwegian econ-
omy is one of the most prosperous in Europe."2 74 Nonetheless,
the Commission foresaw (quite accurately) difficult negotiations
concerning fisheries, agriculture, state monopolies and regional
aid.275
B. The Decisions of the European Council
Although the European Council is not mentioned in Article
0, it should surprise no one that the European Council takes the
critical decisions on whether, when and how a prospective candi-
date State may be brought into the Union. This clearly falls
267. Id. at 21-23.
268. Id. at 23.
269. Id. at 8-10.
270. Id. at 11-16.
271. Id. at 25.
272. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 2, supp. (1993), summarized in 26 E.C. BULL., nlo. 3, at 56
(1993).
273. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 2, supp., at 29-30 (1993).
274. Id. at 10.
275. Id. at 15-18, 24-25, 28-29.
EUROPEAN UNION GROWS
within its sphere in setting the "general political guidelines" of
the Union. 76
In its meeting in Lisbon, June 26-27, 1992, the European
Council took the crucial policy decision to permit negotiations
for accession with any EFTA applicant states which wished to ap-
ply. At this point in time, the European Economic Area Agree-
ment had just been signed, in Oporto in May,2 77 so that the
EFTA states had already committed themselves to accept a large
portion of the acquis communautaire. Considering that the
EEA Agreement "paved the way for opening enlargement nego-
tiations," the European Council declared that official negotia-
tions with any EFTA state could begin after final ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty and after agreement on the "Delors II
package," a reference to the financial arrangements to provide
aid to underdeveloped regions of the Community.27
Because, as we have previously noted, the Maastricht ratifi-
cation process took far longer than anticipated, this decision was
modified by the December 1992 Edinburgh European Council,
which permitted informal negotiations to start in early 1993, but
only authorized their conversion into formal negotiations after
the Treaty on European Union entered into force. 279 Austria,
Finland and Sweden would accordingly join not the European
Community to which they had applied, but rather the European
Union, which would include the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, and the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union as constituent elements of the ac-
quis communautaire.
Although by the time of the Copenhagen European Council
in June 1993, the Maastricht Treaty still had not entered into
force, the end was in sight in view of the favorable result of the
second Danish referendum earlier in the same month. The Eu-
ropean Council could now setJanuary 1, 1995, as the target date
for admission of the new states.2 80 This target date effectively
required the official negotiations to be completed by March
1994, a fast pace, but one necessary in order to permit Parlia-
ment to endorse the admission of new states before Parliament
276. TEU, supra note 7, art. D.
277. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
278. 25 E.C. BuLL., no. 6, at 10 (1992).
279. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
280. 26 E.C. BuLL., no. 6, at 7 (1993).
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should end its current term and dissolve for the June 1994 elec-
tions.
As discussed in Section II(A), the December 1993 Brussels
European Council set virtually all the terms for the changes in
the institutional structure of the Union which were necessary in
order to accommodate the new states. This was by far the most
decisive intervention of the European Council in the accession
process. How the Union institutions should be modified was far
more important an issue than any substantive matter being
threshed out in the negotiations.
C. The Negotiation Phase
Neither Article 237 of the EEC Treaty nor Article 0 of the
Treaty of European Union discuss the mode of negotiations with
applicant states. At the time of the applications of Denmark, Ire-
land and the United Kingdom, the Council set a crucial prece-
dent on the conduct of accession negotiations. In its October 1,
1969 opinion, the Commission had proposed that the Council
give it a mandate to negotiate, with the actual negotiations there-
after conducted under on-going guidelines from the Council, in
a manner analogous to the accepted mode for the Commission's
negotiations in trade matters, notably within GATT.211 The
Council rejected this proposal.
A Council decision on June 8-9, 1970 declared that the
Council would itself carry out negotiations with the applicant
states.282 A representative of the Council President for each six-
month term would preside over the Council team engaged in
the negotiations. Naturally, the Council could request assistance
from staff members of the Commission, and the Commission
could also be asked to do studies or reports to aid in seeking
"possible solutions to specific problems arising in the course of
the negotiations." The Commission acquiesced in this ap-
proach. Although the Fifth General Report called it "somewhat
cumbersome," the Report concluded that the negotiations rep-
resented a successful collaboration between the Council and the
Commission. 8 In the subsequent periods of negotiations with
281. FirH REPORT, supra note 180, at 17, 26.(1972).
282. Id. at 17-18, 27.
283. Id.
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Greece, Portugal and Spain, the Council continued to conduct
the dealings with the assistance of Commission personnel.
In accordance with the wishes of the Edinburgh European
Council, the Council opened the informal negotiation phase
with Austria, Finland and. Sweden on February 1, 1993.284 Nor-
way began to participate after the Commission. presented its
favorable opinion on Norway's application on March 24, 1993.
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States and the
applicant states, frequently joined by other cabinet ministers, en-
gaged in periodic high-level negotiations, while more frequent
meetings at a lower level were carried on by staff members.
Commissioner van den Broek supervised the Commission per-
sonnel assisting in the negotiations. s5
Although all four of the applicant states were members of
EFTA and prospectively were to join in the European Economic
Area, the negotiations with each were kept separate. Mr. Peter-
sen, the Danish President of the Council of Foreign Ministers in
the first part of 1993, emphasized that the Council felt it advisa-
ble to keep the dealings separate, but, wherever possible, to treat
issues in parallel.28 6 This approach undoubtedly reflected the
pragmatic realization that resolution of similar issues might have
to be different for each applicant.
After the Maastricht Treaty entered into force on November
1, 1993, the negotiations were converted into formal ones for
accession to the European Union under Article 0. The pace
then quickened. Indeed, at parallel ministerial level meetings in
Brussels on December 21, 1993, "negotiations on the common
foreign and security policy and on justice and home affairs were
concluded."287
Nonetheless, a number of thorny issues remained to be re-
solved, especially on the topics of fisheries, agriculture, environ-
mental rules, regional aid, state monopolies and contributions
to the Community budget. A series of virtually round the clock
bargaining sessions were held at the ministerial level in Brussels
284. 26 E.C. Buu., no. 1/2, at 67 (1993).
285. Dierk Booss, the Commission legal service representative on the negotiation
team, describes in detail the negotiating procedure at the ministerial and lower levels in
Booss & Forman, supra note 1, at 104-08.
286. 26 E.C. BuLL., no. 1/2, at 67 (1993).
287. 26 E.C. BuLL., no. 12, at 97 (1993).
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from February 25 to March 1, 1994.288 This final series of meet-
ings enabled the conclusion of the negotiations with Austria,
Finland and Sweden, but not with Norway. Resolving the com-
peting interests of Norway and Spain over fishing rights proved a
real cliff-hanger. Arduous negotiations on the subject were pur-
sued through mid-March, resulting in a compromise grudgingly
accepted by Norway.28 9 The negotiations over fishing rights be-
came linked with the last unresolved institutional structure ques-
tion, namely the level of the qualified voting majority. For some
time the United Kingdom received the support of Spain in its
opposition to the proposed increase in the number of states that
could be outvoted in a qualified majority vote. The Spanish sup-
port represented in part a tactical maneuver to win concessions
in the fisheries dispute. When a fishing rights compromise was
worked out to Spain's satisfaction, its support for the U.K. posi-
tion weakened, and the Joanina Compromise (described in Sec-
tion IIB above) could be adopted.
The negotiations formally closed on March 30, 1994.
Counting the period of informal negotiations in 1993, they con-
sumed only fourteen months. This is remarkably short, when
compared to the nearly three years required in the Greek acces-
sion negotiations, and over six years devoted to the dealings with
Portugal and Spain.
There are undoubtedly two reasons for this. The first is the
fact that all four applicants had already spent over a year in the
negotiations for the EEA Agreement, which resulted in their ac-
ceptance of key Treaty principles as well as a vast number of in-
ternal market and related legislative measures.
The second reason for the relative rapid pace of the negoti-
ations is that on many issues, such as progress toward the EMU
or a common foreign and security policy, the Union ministers
were negotiating from a position of strength. The applicant
state governments (apart, to some degree, from Norway) had
powerful political as well as economic pressures to seek member-
ship in the Union. The European Union had, quite simply, be-
come so successful in so many spheres of economic activity, and
represented such an added bulwark in foreign affairs (where a
288. E.U. BULL., no. 3, at 64 (1994).
289. Id. The key derogations for Norway are summarized in Booss & Forman,
supra note 1, at 125.
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resurgent Russian threat could never be discounted), that it was
difficult for the applicants to hold steadfast except on issues
whose adverse resolution might jeopardize critical popular sup-
port in the subsequent popular referenda. On some delicate is-
sues, transitional solutions of a compromise character had to be
found, but on many points the firmness of the Council negotia-
tors ultimately achieved acceptance of their position.
Although many of the issues raised during the negotiations
were quite important, this Article can only give a very rapid sur-
vey of the transitional measures agreed upon to resolve them.
An interesting initial note is that these transitional measures are
almost always effective for only four years, relatively short in com-
parison to the periods of seven, eight or even ten years for transi-
tional measures set in the accession treaties with Greece, Portu-
gal and Spain. Clearly the arrangements already worked out for
phasing in aspects of the internal market program in the EEA
Agreement facilitated shorter periods in the 1994 Act of Acces-
sion.
The Commission summarized the most important transi-
tional measures in an information memo on May 18, 1994.290
The most complicated ones relate to the most sensitive subjects,
agriculture and fisheries. With regard to agriculture, Austria
and Finland have higher levels of price supports and subsidies
than those permitted by the Common Agricultural Policy. The
applicant states were reluctant to reduce these protective meas-
ures, which were intended to promote farming in the difficult
climactic conditions prevailing in the Alpine regions in Austria
and the nordic regions of Finland and Sweden. The Union in-
sisted that the new states introduce at once the price levels set in
the CAP, but permitted a system of subsidies over the next five
years.291
Concerning fisheries, although the new states were obliged
to accept the basic principles and approach of the Common
Fisheries Policy, a transitional period was set to allow the devel-
opment of new catch quotas, supervision of endangered fish spe-
290. Information Memo (1994) 32 (May 18, 1994), summarized in Common Mkt
Rep. - New Dev. (CCH) 97,397, at 53,403-10; see also Booss & Forman, supra note 1, at
117-26.
291. 1994 Act of Accession, supra note 125, arts. 137-38, OJ. C 241/21, at 45
(1994). These provisions are summarized in Common Mkt. Rep. - New Dev. 97,397,
at 53,405-06, and in Booss & Forman, supra note 1, at 122-24.
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cies, access to various territorial waters, etc.2 92 Because Norway
did not ratify the accession treaty (in some measure because
Norwegian fishing interests so vigorously opposed accession),
some of the most difficult future issues in this sector have disap-
peared.
A third area of considerable negotiating difficulty related to
the high standards of health and environmental protection in
the applicant states, many of which were higher than Commu-
nity standards. Austria, Finland and Sweden were allowed to
keep their higher standards for petroleum products, pesticides,
certain chemical products, waste control, etc., for four years,
during which period the Community is supposed to reexamine
its own levels of protection.2 93 As noted previously, the three
new States may well contribute to the introduction of higher en-
vironmental protection levels in the Community.
For Austria, the most sensitive issue was linked to its strict
rules on trans alpine road and rail transit, intended to protect its
alpine regions. Austria had to accept the principle of Commu-
nity control over transport, but the Austrian limits were left in
place for three years, with possible extension for another three
years. 2
9 4
Regional aids and special protection for particular groups
and regions was another sensitive topic. The Community agreed
to review rapidly the application of certain nordic regions for
Community structural fund aid. 9 5 The preferential rights ac-
corded by Finland and Sweden to the Sami people (often called
Lapps) with regard to their settlements and reindeer herding
292. The fisheries provisions for Finland are contained in Articles 88-95 of the
1994 Act of Accession, supra note 125, O.J. C 241/21, at 38-39 (1994), and for Sweden
in Articles 115-23, id. O.J. C 241/21, at 41-43 (1994). The transitional arrangements
are summarized in Common Mkt Rep. - New Dev. (CCH) 1 97,397, at 53,406-07.
293. 1994 Act of Accession, supra note 125, art. 69, O.J. C 241/21, at 35 (1994)
(Austria); id. art. 84, O.J. C 241/21, at 37 (1994) (Finland); id. art. 112, O.J. C 241/21,
at 41 (1994) (Sweden). This topic is summarized in Common Mkt Rep. - New Dev.
(CCH) 97,397, at 53,405, with the interesting note that no derogation was allowed for
the hunting of polar bears and whales. If the Community standards are not raised, the
new States might then try to obtain a derogation for their higher standards under EC
Treaty, supra note 7, art. 100a(4). See Booss & Forman, supra note 1, at 117-18.
294. Protocol No. 9 on road, rail and combined transport in Austria, annexed to
1994 Act of Accession, supra note 125, OJ. C 241/21, at 361 (1994), summamr.ed in Com-
mon Mkt Rep. - New Dev. (CCH) 97,308, at 53,303-04.
295. 1994 Act of Accession, supra note 125, art. 142, O.J. C 241/21, at 46 (1994).
EUROPEAN UNION GROWS
were preserved by a Protocol. 96
Two rather curious derogations were also granted. Austria,
Finland and Sweden all have limits on the rights of non-residents
to buy secondary residences or holiday homes. They were per-
mitted to keep these limits for five years. 97 It is noteworthy that
there is a special Protocol in the Maastricht Treaty2 98 permitting
Denmark to keep its restrictions on the sale of holiday homes to
non-residents. At some point, a Community-wide regime on this
subject may have to be developed.
By the second curious derogation, Sweden was allowed to
continue to permit the sale of "snus," a moist snuff, even though
Community rules elsewhere prohibit this tobacco product.299
Whatever its health consequences, snus is a traditionally popular
product in Sweden and the negotiators presumably feared that
banning it might antagonize a large bloc of Swedish voters in the
referendum.
With the successful conclusion of the negotiations, on April
19, 1994, the Commission was able to provide the final opinion
required by Article 0, finding the "provisions so agreed are fair
and proper" and that the enlargement would preserve the Euro-
pean Union's "internal cohesion and dynamism." 0 This opin-
ion also concluded that the institutional structure set by the Eu-
ropean Council was "acceptable," at least until the next intergov-
ernmental conference. °1
D. The Assent of the Parliament
One of the important rights gained by the Parliament
through the Single European Act's 1987 amendment of Article
237 (now Article 0) of the EEC Treaty is that of "assent" to any
accession. 0 2 The term "assent" means that Parliament must give
296. Id. Protocol No. 3 on the Sami people, OJ. C 241/21 (1994). This is a per-
manent derogation. See Booss & Forman, supra note 1, at 102 n.19.
297. Id. art. 70, OJ. C 241/21, at 35 (1994) (Austria); id. art. 87, OJ. C 241/21, at
38 (1994) (Finland); id. art. 114, OJ. C 241/21, at 41 (1994) (Sweden). The applicant
states requested, but were refused, the same permanent derogation that Denmark en-
joys. See Booss & Forman, supra note 1, at 118.
298. TEU, supra note 7, Protocol on the Acquisition of Property in Denmark.
299. Common Mkt. Rep. - New Dev. (CCH) 97,397, at 53,410.
300. Commission Opinion of 19 April 1994, supra note 112, recital 4, O.J. C 241/3,
at 3 (1994).
301. Id. recital 5, OJ. C 241/3, at 3 (1994).
302. See supra note 244. Parliament gave its assent to the accession of Austria, Fin-
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its consent, in this case by an affirmative vote of "an absolute
majority of its component members." The 1995 enlargement
marks the first time Parliament has exercised its right of assent.
It was clear from the outset that many members of Parliament
intended this stage of the accession process to be a serious re-
view of the merits, not a pro forma blessing of the work of the
Council and Commission.
Once negotiations with the applicants opened, in successive
resolutions on February 10,July 15, and November 17, 1993, Par-
liament endorsed both the progress made and the ultimate
goal.3"' Nonetheless, Parliament also stressed that the appli-
cants must accept the acquis communautaire in its entirety, in-
cluding all the innovations of the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover,
in its November 17th resolution, shortly before the Brussels Eu-
ropean Council meeting on institutional structure, Parliament
urged that the 1995 enlargement be the occasion for improve-
ments in the legislative process and for an increase in the powers
of Parliament.
The conclusion of the negotiations gave Parliament almost
total satisfaction on the acceptance of the acquis com-
munautaire. Indeed, in a resolution of March 24, 1994, Parlia-
ment expressed particular satisfaction with the applicants' forth-
right acceptance of the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
which it considered "would enhance the Union's capacity for in-
ternational action."3" 4 In its final series of four resolutions, en-
dorsing each state's application on May 5, 1994, Parliament re-
peated this point and added its hope that the new Member
States would help advance efforts to achieve high levels of envi-
ronmental protection.0 5
Many Members of Parliament were, however, both dismayed
and angered by the failure of the European Council to seize the
occasion to make any reforms in institutional structure. They
were particularly disappointed by the minor increase in the
land, Norway and Sweden after the negotiations were completed. An argument can be
made that Parliament ought to give its assent to the opening of negotiations as well,
after the first Commission opinion. See Booss & Forman, supra note 1, at 99.
303. OJ. C 72 (1993), summarized in 26 E.C. BULL., no. 1/2, at 67-68 (1993); O.J. C
255 (1993), summarized in 26 E.C. BULL., no. 7/8, at 69 (1993), and OJ. C 329 (1993),
summarized in 26 E.C. BULL., no. 11, at 66 (1993).
304. European Parliament Resolution on Enlargement and Neutrality, OJ. C 114/
61 (1994), summarized in E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 66 (1994).
305. E.U. BULL., no. 5, at 59 (1994).
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number of States that could be outvoted in a qualified majority
vote in the Council, and frankly incensed by the Joanina Com-
promise language. 0 6 The Commission's blunt assessment of the
Joanina Compromise as only a "political agreement," purely
transitional until the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference,30 7
placated some MEPs, but not all.
News reports suggested that Parliament's assent might well
be at risk. Fears were expressed that Parliament might either
adopt a motion to postpone action until the newly-elected Parlia-
ment in the Fall could consider the issue, or that so many MEPs
would decline to vote that the requisite absolute majority of all
members of Parliament might not be attained.0 8
The governments of the applicant states were naturally dis-
mayed, and lobbied energetically, arguing that the adverse effect
of a delay mightjeopardize the popular referenda in their coun-
tries. At a critical moment in early May, Chancellor Kohl prom-
ised that the "reflection committee," which the European Coun-
cil had instructed to be constituted to study issues before the
1996 Intergovernmental Conference, would include representa-
tives of the Parliament, which would also be more closely in-
volved later in the review of issues during the IGC.30 9 These ef-
forts undoubtedly played a considerable role in achieving a
favorable vote.
Parliament's final votes on each applicant on May 5, 1994
proved overwhelmingly positive, ranging from 376 to 381 in
favor out of a total absolute number of 567 MEPs. 1 ° Moreover,
there were only a few negative votes, ranging from fifty-seven to
sixty-one. However, it should also be noted that an earlier mo-
tion to defer the issue until the newly elected Parliament did
306. See May Be Delayed: European Enlargement, ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 1994, at. 52;
David Gardner, Euro-Mps May Delay Enty of New Members, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1994, at 1;
Vote Delay Not Expected Despite Fears that Parliament May Reject Enlargement, EUROWATCH,
May 2, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurwch File.
307. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 306.
309. See The Door Opens: European Enlargement, EcoNoMIsT, May 7, 1994, at 54.
310. E.U. BuLL., no. 5, at 85 (1994). The resolutions are respectively: European
Parliament Legislative Resolution of 4 May 1994 on the Application of Austria to Be-
come a Member of the European Union, O.J. C 241/3 (1994); European Parliament
Legislative Resolution of 4 May 1994 on the Application of by the Republic of Finland
to Become a Member of the European Union, o.J. C 241/4 (1994); and European
Parliament Legislative Resolution of 4 May 1994 on the Application by the Kingdom of
Sweden to Become a Member of the European Union, O.J. C 241/5 (1994).
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garner one-third support, being defeated 305 to 150.311 Even
seriously raising a motion to defer constituted a clear warning to
the Member States that many MEPs continued to feel strongly
that institutional revisions should move forward.
On May 16, 1994, the Council took the final requisite inter-
nal act under Article 0, adopting a decision to accept the appli-
cations.3 1 The stage could then shift to the popular referenda
in each applicant.
E. The Ratification Process
Ratification of the accession of Austria, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden proved both straight-forward and easy in the Mem-
ber States, in vivid contrast to the ardor and perils of the ratifica-
tion of the Maastricht Treaty. This is not surprising, because
most of the parliaments considered that the addition of these
states would result in a manifest strengthening of the political
and economic force of the European Union. Although several
of the Mediterranean States clearly experienced some concern
that their particular interests and needs might be somewhat ne-
glected by the increase in northern states, still their level of dis-
comfort was not sufficiently high to jeopardize in any degree the
ratification.
Regardless of whether its constitution required this, each of
the applicant states' governments had decided that the decision
to join the European Union would be so momentous as to make
a popular referendum appropriate. The level of debate in each
country prior to each referendum proved more intense than had
been anticipated and, apart from Austria, the popular vote out-
come proved also much closer than had been optimistically pre-
dicted by the government leaders.
The Austrian referendum came first, on June 12, 1994. The
outcome provided a much needed shot in the arm for confi-
dence in the European Union. With an impressive turnout of
311. See Amid Record Turnout of MEPs, Parliament Overwhelmingly Approves EUEnlage-
ment, EUROWATCH, May 16, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurwch File.
312. Decision of the Council of the European Union of 16 May 1994, O.J. C 241/6
(1994). After the signature of the Act of Accession at Corfu on June 24, the applicant
states were permitted to send representatives to Council meetings for the rest of the
year to enable their consultation in decision-making, without, of course, any right to
vote. See the Exchange of Letters on this procedure, 1994 Act of Accession, supra note
125, O.J. C 241/21, at 399-401 (1994).
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81%, the vote was 66.6% in favor.'" 3 Even in Tyrol, where con-
cern was highest that accession might adversely impact the qual-
ity of agricultural life and the environment, 56% voted in favor.
The vociferous criticism of the right-wing Freedom Party, claim-
ing that the Union would imperil the Austrian identity and the
quality of life ("square tomatoes" was a vivid illustration), was
soundly rejected. 14
That the Finnish referendum should likewise prove
favorable was not a surprise. At the time of its 1992 application,
President Koivisto told Parliament that Finland had no realistic
alternative to accession, which would enhance its ties with the
West and provide it with essential access to markets.3 15 The
Finnish government's support for accession was strong and
steadfast.
On October 17, 1994, 57% of the Finnish voters approved
the accession. 1 6 Although certainly a decisive outcome, and
helpful in the closer battles in Sweden and Norway, the affirma-
tive vote was somewhat lower than had been hoped. Apparently
many voters in the rural north of Finland were unhappy with the
agricultural aspects of the accession arrangements.
From the time of its application in 1991, the successive
Swedish governments and all the major parties had supported
accession, with more or less fervor. It proved, however, ex-
tremely difficult to translate this into popular support. During
the campaign, the polls consistently showed a narrow majority
against accession, but always with about one-third undecided. 17
To the enormous relief of the Swedish government, the No-
vember 13, 1994 referendum produced a narrow, but adequate
margin of support: 52.2% yes versus 47% no.318 Apparently the
efforts of the political party leadership and business interests -
universally in favor - ultimately won the day. The large opposi-
tion obviously reflected voter sentiment in favor of Sweden's
313. E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 86 (1994).
314. See Austria's Yes Clears Way for Expansion, GUARDIAN, June 13, 1994, at 7.
315. Finnish President Backs EC Application, Reuter Library Rep., Feb. 7, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
316. E.U. BULL., no. 10, at 52 (1994).
317. See Not There Yet: The EC's Nordic Applicants, ECONOMIST, Apr. 2, 1994, at 49.
318. E.U. BULL., no. 11, at 75 (1994); Swedes Vote in Referendum to Join European
Union, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 14, 1994, at A6.
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traditional independence and concern for its agricultural inter-
ests.
No one ever doubted that persuading the people of Norway
to join would be a very difficult task. After all, Norway had al-
ready been accepted along with Denmark, Iceland and the
United Kingdom in the first enlargement, only to see popular
opposition result in a narrowly adverse vote (53%) in a 1972 ref-
erendum."1 9 Although the popular government of Prime Minis-
ter Brundtland fought vigorously for accession, and most polit-
ical parties likewise endorsed the goal, throughout 1994 the
polls showed a majority in opposition. 20 Support surged after
the favorable Finnish and Swedish referenda, but not strongly
enough.
The November 29, 1994 Norwegian vote proved almost a
replay of the 1972 referendum. The negative vote represented
only a narrow majority of 52.2%, but that was decisive.321 The
Brundtland government obeyed the popular expression of will
and withdrew the application. Although most businessmen, pro-
fessionals and urban dwellers supported accession, the fishing
and farming interests were adamantly opposed. Clearly, the
traditional Norwegian desire for independence from large and
remote government had a major impact - after all, Norway had
gained its own independence laboriously after 400 years of Dan-
ish or Swedish hegemony.
Although the rest of the European Union was naturally
keenly disappointed by the Norwegian outcome, it had been
both anticipated and largely discounted in political circles.3 22 If
Sweden had declined to join, the blow would have been both
bitter and serious. Norway's adverse decision required the rapid
revision of the institutional arrangements set in the Act of Acces-
sion, but only marginally reduced the 1995 enlargement's over-
whelmingly positive impact on the European Union.
319. SIxTH REPORT, supra note 118, at 17, 1 6.
320. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
321. E.U. BULL., no. 11, at 75; Vote in Norway Blocks Joining Europe's Union, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at Al.
322. Left at Altar by Norway, Europe Tries Stiff Upper Lip, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1994, at
EUROPEAN UNION GROWS
V. ISSUES RAISED BY A FUTURE ENLARGEMENT OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
A. Speculation on Candidates for Accession: Norway, Switzerland
and Iceland
There are two groups of nations with great interest in acces-
sion, some of which are likely candidates in the near-term future.
These are the new democracies in central Europe and three
Mediterranean basin states, Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey. Before
discussing in some detail their prospects, we should more rapidly
consider the chance that Norway, Switzerland or Iceland might
apply.
The nation whose accession could no doubt be the easiest
to arrange, if only its people could be convinced to agree to ac-
cession, is Norway. Unfortunately, it appears unlikely that the
Norwegian government will want to make a third attempt in the
near future, although it is always possible that the continued eco-
nomic success of the Union will prove too strong a magnet over
the long term. If a large group of countries apply and are likely
to join around the turn of the century, a sufficient shift in Nor-
wegian popular sentiment might occur in the polls, tempting the
government to a renewed effort.
Switzerland's accession would also be relatively easy, if its
people could be convinced to shift their views on the question.
After all, the December 1992 referendum on the European Eco-
nomic Area almost resulted in a tie, with the negative votes pre-
vailing by a tiny 50.3% majority.123 The Swiss government and
the financial and commercial leadership remain keenly inter-
ested in the prospect of accession.324 The successful integration
of Austria, Finland and Sweden into the European Union, to-
gether with the on-going success of the internal market pro-
gram, may well produce such a sufficiently large shift in popular
opinion that the government will be encouraged to renew its ap-
plication.
Moreover, Switzerland and the Union have been engaged in
discussions for over a year on how to improve their relations
323. See supra note 52.
324. See Swiss Leaders to Make New Bid to Join European Economic Area, EUROWATCH,
Oct. 18, 1993, at 4, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurwch File (indicating that
Swiss government told Swiss Parliament on October 4-5, 1993 that it intended ulti-
mately to try again to join Community).
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even though Switzerland rentains outside the European Eco-
nomic Area."2 5 If these negotiations prove sufficiently produc-
tive so that the Swiss government can point to acceptable solu-
tions to some of the issues that previously troubled the Swiss
population, this may facilitate a change in sentiment. Indeed,
totally surrounded by the Union in both geopolitical and eco-
nomic terms, Switzerland would seem to be a likely candidate in
the next wave of applicant countries, even though no signal has
as yet come from the Swiss government to that effect.
Iceland, which is, along with Norway, one of the only two
remaining members of the European Economic Area,3 26 does
not appear to be a plausible candidate for accession. Neither
the government nor the people of Iceland manifested much in-
terest in the possibility when the Scandinavian states applied,
and the Norwegian people's rejection of accession has undoubt-
edly confirmed the negative posture of Iceland. Iceland's con-
trol of its own fishing interests is so paramount a national con-
cern that it is unlikely Iceland would want to apply.
B. Central European Enlargement: The Candidates and
Their Prospects
This Article would become excessively long if we attempted
to trace the evolution in trade relations between the European
Community and central European states, which the author has
in any event done elsewhere. 2 7 At the present time, the Euro-
pean Union has its closest relations with the six central Euro-
pean nations with which it has signed Europe Agreements,
namely, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and the Slovak Republic. 28 Negotiations for Europe
325. See the Council conclusion authorizing attempts to reach such arrangements
with Switzerland in 26 E.C. BULL., no. 11, at 67 (1993); the Council conclusion on issues
created by the February 20, 1994 Swiss referendum on limits of transalpine road traffic,
E.U. BULL., no. 5, at 61 (1994); and the Council authorization for negotiations on free
movement of persons, agriculture, public procurement and other subjects, E.U. BULL.,
no. 10, at 52 (1994). These negotiations opened on December 12, 1994. 1994 REPORT,
supra note 99, at 273, 1 784.
326. See supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
327. Roger Goebel, The European Community and Eastern Europe: Deepening' and
Widening' the Community Brand of Economic Federalism, 1 NEw EUROPE L. REv. 163, 213-23
(1993); see Marise Cremona, Community Relations with the Visegrad Group, 18 EUR. L. REv.
345 (1993); Helen E. Hartnell, Central/Eastern Europe: The Long and Winding Road To-
ward European Union, 15 CoMP. L. Y.B. OF INT'L BUS. 179 (1993).
328. The Europe Agreements with Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were
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Agreements have also been begun with the Baltic states, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania, and are soon expected with Slovenia.329
If the European Economic Area can best be understood as a
"halfway house" to membership in the European Union, so the
Europe Agreements can perhaps best be described as a junior,
somewhat watered-down, version of the European Economic
Area arrangements. Europe Agreements are, technically speak-
ing, an unusually high-grade form of association agreements,
which are in turn agreements which encompass not only trade
preferences, but also usually provide for investment right guar-
antees, technical aid, and political and social cooperation."3 ' In
September 1990, the Commission issued a report, "Association
Agreements with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe:
A General Outline," describing the proposed structure of such
agreements, and creating the term "Europe Agreements" as one
which would mark "the importance of the political initiative
which they represent."3 '
The Europe Agreements are intended not only to achieve
free trade (except for certain agricultural products) between the
European Union and the respective central European states, but
also to bring these states in large measure within the internal
market."3 ' Reciprocal rights of free movement of services and
signed on December 16, 1991. 24 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 95-96 (1991). The Europe
Agreement with Romania was signed on February 1, 1993, 26 E.C. BULL., no. 1/2, at 69
(1993), and that with Bulgaria was signed on March 8, 1993i 26 E.C. BULL., no. 3, at 58
(1993). The agreement with Czechoslovakia had to be replaced by separate agreements
with the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic on October 4, 1993. 26 E.C. BULL.,
no. 10, at 70-71 (1993). The Europe Agreements with Hungary and Poland entered
into force on February 1, 1994. 26 E.C. Buu-., no. 12, at 101 (1993). Those with the
other four states became effective on February 1, 1995. Comm'n Info. Mem. 95 (4)
(Feb. 1, 1995), summarized in Common Mkt. Rep. - New Dev. (CCH) 1 97,786, at 53,733.
329. The Council approved negotiations with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on
November 28, 1994, E.U. BULL., no. 11, at 77 (1994).
330. The Community power to enter into association agreements is set forth in
Article 238 of the EC Treaty, supra note 7, which. was amended by the single European
Act in 1987, supra note 2, to require that Parliament give its assent to such agreements.
The first association agreements were with Greece in 1961 and Turkey in 1963. Over
the years the Community has entered into such agreements with most neighboring
states including, for example, Cyprus, Malta, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria, and
Tunisia. See William Rowlinson, An Overview of EEC Trade with Non-Community Countries
and the Law Governing those External Agreements, 13 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 205 (1989-90).
331. Twaw-FouRTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 267-68, 672. The full text of the
General Outline appears in Agence Europe, Eur. Docs. No. 1646/47 (Sept. 7, 1990).




the right of establishment are phased in over five to ten year
terms. The Europe Agreements do not, however, create any
right of free movement of workers, because the European Union
not unreasonably fears that a flood of unemployed workers from
central Europe could enormously augment the problems of
chronic high unemployment in western Europe. The central
European states must develop and enforce rules of free-market
competition. They must also, on a best efforts basis, model their
new rules governing banking, company law, securities, intellec-
tual property, employee rights, consumer rights and environ-
mental protection on those laid down by Community directives.
The Europe Agreements do not, however, provide for any form
of institutional structure among the central European states
themselves, or between the European Union and the states en-
joying Europe Agreements, which represents a major difference
when comparing such agreements with that for the European
Economic Area.
That so many central European states would accept such far-
reaching obligations was in large measure due to their hope ulti-
mately to attain membership in the European Union, although
naturally they were also enticed by the financial and technical
aid offered by the Union, and the expectation of economic ben-
efits through partial participation in the internal market.
Although the Council and Commission initially opposed making
any commitment to the eventual admission of central European
states, they did agree that each Europe Agreement might begin
with a Preamble clause foreseeing the possibility of member-
ship.3 3 3
Reacting to a Commission study, "Towards a Closer Associa-
tion with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,"3 3 4 the
Copenhagen European Council meeting on June 21-22, 1993
agreed that "the associated countries in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope" could become Member States when they ultimately satis-
333. The Preamble of each Europe Agreement ends with an express reference to
the "final objective.., to become a member of the Community." See, e.g., Agreement
with the Czech Republic, pmbl., OJ. L 360/1, at 1 (1994).
334. The Commission report was actually prepared for the December 1992 Edin-
burgh European Council, which welcomed it, but presumably thought it premature to
react formally to it. 25 EC BuLL., no. 12, at 36-37, 122-23 (1992). An unofficial copy of
the Commission report is printed in Agence Europe (Docts.), no. 1814 (Dec. 9, 1992).
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fled "the economic and political conditions required."33 5 (Note
the timing: the Copenhagen European Council knew of the
favorable outcome of the second Danish referendum, assuring
the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, and was also en-
couraging rapid conclusion of the accession negotiations with
Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, so it could for the first
time seriously consider the prospect of further enlargement.)
The European Council set a number of important condi-
tions, effectively encompassing much of the acquis com-
munautaire, which the central European states would have to ful-
fill:
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, human rights, and respect for and the protection of mi-
norities, the existence of a functioning market economy, as
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes
the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of member-
ship, including adherence to the aims of political, economic
and monetary union.3 3 6
The stress on two preconditions, a stable and effective demo-
cratic system and a functional free market economy, is not sur-
prising, given the difficult struggles to attain each in the central
European states, struggles which are not yet assured of achieving
definitive success. This 1993 Copenhagen European Council
declaration is somewhat reminiscent of the earlier 1978 Copen-
hagen European Council's "Declaration on Democracy, "3 7 in
which the European Council was tacitly admonishing Greece,
Portugal, and Spain that they must irrevocably retain their new
democratic systems in order to qualify as Member States.
The Copenhagen European Council also approved an inter-
esting mode of enhancing ties between the Union and the states
with Europe Agreements, namely, a structured system of high-
level political meetings. These should be held, usually at the
ministerial level, "on matters of common interest," including not
only internal market matters, but also common foreign and se-
curity policy and cooperation in justice and home affairs.
335. 26 EC BULL., no. 6, at 13 (1993).
336. Id.
337. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
338. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 18 (1993).
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These "structured meetings" have now begun and are per-
ceived to be an important mode of dialogue and planning for
further assistance to the six central European states presently en-
joying Europe Agreements. On March 7, 1994 the Council
agreed that the European Council should meet annually with
the Heads of States or Government of the six states, and the
Council should meet semi-annually with the ministerial-level rep-
resentatives of these states.3 3 9 These meetings commenced with
one of the Environment Ministers on October 6, 1994, followed
by a session of the Foreign Ministers on October 31, 1994.4 °
A Council report to the recent December 1994 Essen Euro-
pean Council proposed that the "structured relationship" should
now also include semi-annual meetings of the justice and home
affairs ministers (in addition to drug control and illegal immi-
gration, stolen cars has become a serious problem), and annual
meetings of ministers responsible for economics and finance, ag-
riculture, environment, transport, research and development,
telecommunications, cultural affairs, and education. 41 Mani-
festly such regular high-level meetings are bound to further co-
operation and mutual understanding at least, and hopefully will
also solve problems and promote progress when agreement at
lower levels cannot be reached.
On April 1 and April 8, 1994 respectively, Prime Minister
Boross of Hungary and Prime Minister Pawlak of Poland offi-
cially applied for membership in the European Union.34 The
Council reacted favorably and requested the Commission to be-
gin work on its opinion,343 the first important procedural step
under Article 0 of the Maastricht Treaty. Because the Commis-
sion usually requires a year or more to evaluate the economic
aspects of an applicant's suitability, these opinions are not ex-
pected in the near future.
The Czech and Slovak Republics are expected to file their
official applications soon. Along with Hungary and Poland,
these two nations form the Visegrad group, so-named because
339. E.U. BULL., no. 3, at 68 (1994).
340. E.U. BuLL., no. 10, at 52-53 (1994).
341. Report from the Council of the European Council on a strategy to prepare
the accession of the associated CCEE, Annex IV to the European Council Conclusions,
at 33-34 (to be included in E.U. BuLL., no. 12 (1994) (forthcoming 1995).
342. E.U. BuLL., no. 4, at 6 (1994).
343. Id.
EUROPEAN UNION GROWS
they began cooperating in 1994 at a meeting in that city. 3 4 The
Visegrad group signed the first Europe Agreements with the
Community on December 16, 1991, and have made the fastest
progress in implementing these agreements. Because the cer-
tainty of their long-term democratic credentials is no longer in
doubt and because they have made the broadest progress toward
free-market economies, there exists a definite possibility that
their accession applications will be considered at an earlier time
than those of other interested central European states.
As noted before, Bulgaria and Romania signed their Europe
Agreements in 1993, and these have just entered into force on
February 1, 1995.345 Negotiations are presently underway for Eu-
rope Agreements with the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, and are expected soon with Slovenia.' Signature is antici-
pated during the French Council presidency in early 1995,
which would mean that the agreements could be ratified and
enter into force sometime in 1996. Soon after, one may antici-
pate that all four states would be apt to apply formally for Union
membership. They are presumably the last central European
states which could be considered for membership in the near-
term future. The relatively poor economic condition of Albania,
and the involvement of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, and
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia directly or indi-
rectly in the civil strife in that region excludes them as candi-
dates for the foreseeable future.
Although the European Union has entered into close trade
and assistance arrangements, called Partnership and Coopera-
tion Agreements, with Russia and the Ukraine, 47 and has re-
344. These states formed their own Central European Free Trade Association on
December 21, 1992, effective March 1, 1993, eliminating most barriers on trade among
them by 2001. See EUROPEAN BANK OF RECONSTRUcrION AND DEVELOPMENT ("EBRD"),
REPORT ON ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
113 (OcL 1994) [hereinafter EBRD REPORT].
345. See supra note 324.
346. The December 9-10, 1994 Essen European Council urgedthe rapid conclu-
sion of the negotiations for Europe Agreements with Slovenia and the Baltic states.
Essen European Council Conclusion, at 13 (Dec. 10, 1994), reprinted in E.U. BULL., no.
12 (1994) (forthcoming 1995).
347. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia was signed in Corfu
on June 24, 1994, during the European Council meeting, and with the Ukraine in Lux-
embourg on June 14, 1994. 1994 REPORT, supra note 99, at 282-83, 807. The purpose
and provision of both agreements are briefly summarized in E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 89-91
(1994). These agreements are not considered association agreements under Article
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tained trade agreements with almost all the other countries in
the Commonwealth of Independent States ("CIS") (the former
Soviet Union),"' there is no present expectation that these will
be promoted to the status of Europe Agreements in the near
term future, if ever. Geopolitical considerations make it highly
unlikely that any of these countries could become candidates for
the European Union in this century or even very early in the
next century. Indeed, whether Russia will look favorably on the
addition of certain central European applicant states to the Eu-
ropean Union is still very much a matter of doubt. For example,
Russian concern for the protection of the large Russian minority
in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, together with the traditional
Russian geopolitical interest in the Baltic region may impede
movement by those states to membership in the Union. Like-
wise, whether Romania is willing to renounce irrevocably all
hope of reunion with Moldova may be a weighty factor in
Romania's progress toward accession.
In June 1994, while the European Council at Corfu was wel-
coming Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, it also refocused
attention on the possible further enlargement of the Union.
The European Council requested the Commission to make spe-
cific proposals for further progress in relations with interested
central European states, but also set further institutional modifi-
cations at the 1996 inter-governmental conference as a precondi-
tion before further enlargement negotiations.349
The Commission accordingly prepared a new report, "The
Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Accession," issued
on July 13, 1994.50 In turn, the Council prepared a similar re-
port to the most recent European Council in Essen in December
1994. 3-1 Both these reports analyzed the serious issues which
238, so they do not meet the precondition for an accession application set by the Euro-
pean Council meeting at Copenhagen in April 1993. See supra note 335.
348. All of the countries in the CIS except for Azerbaijan have succeeded to the
provisions of the prior Trade and Cooperation Agreement entered into between the
Community and the Soviet Union on December 18, 1989. 22 E.C. Buu., no. 12, at 110
(1989); see EBRD REPORT, supra note 344, at 110 (summarizing status of trade agree-
ments with CIS nations).
349. E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 14 (1994).
350. COM (94) 320 Final (July 13, 1994), summarized in E.U. BULL., no. 718, at 73
(1994) and in Common Mkt. Rep. - New Dev. (CCH) 97,511, at 53,534.
351. See supra.note 341.
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would have to be resolved before accession could be seriously
considered, stressed the need for deepened political coopera-
tion with prospective applicants, and proposed greater efforts in
accommodating the applicants to the internal market.
Reacting to these reports, the Essen European Council "de-
cided to boost and improve the process of further preparing the
associated States of Central and Eastern Europe for acces-
sion."352 The European Council endorsed the heightened use of
structured relations at the ministerial level. Perhaps most impor-
tant, the Essen European Council requested the Commission to
prepare a White Paper with concrete proposals to facilitate the
applicant states' introduction of internal market and related
measures, with a timetable for action modeled upon the famous
June 1985 White Paper on Completing the Internal Market. The
Commission is currently at work on this work on this project, to
be submitted to the Cannes European Council in June 1995.111
Thus, the European Union is now committed to serious
consideration of the accession of a number of Central and East-
ern European states, presumably at least four (the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic) and perhaps as
many as ten (in addition, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, and Slovenia). Besides these nations, there are how-
ever also prospective Mediterranean candidates.
C. The Mediterranean Applicants for Accession
The earliest applicant, Turkey, is not presently considered a
serious candidate. In 1989, the Commission opinion on the
Turkish application concluded that Turkey could not as yet ful-
fill Member States obligations, largely because of economic
problems but also because of some concern for its democratic
stability. The Commission did propose closer trade arrange-
ments and political cooperation with Turkey. 5 4 Successive Eu-
352. Essen European Council Conclusions, at 12 (Dec. 10, 1994) (to be reported
in E.U. BuLL., no. 12 (1994) (forthcoming 1995)).
353. Id. at 13.
354. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIID GENERAL REPORT ON THE
AcrivmEs OF THE COMMUNITY 1988, at 337-38, 801 (1989). In its 1992 Report, "Eu-
rope and the Challenge of Enlargement," the Commission referred to "Turkey's geopo-
litical importance" and the need to "anchor it firmly within the future architecture of
Europe." Cha//enge of Enlargement, supra note 13, at 17. For a review of some of Turkey's
economic problems (its GNP is proportionally only one-third as high as that of Portu-
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ropean Council meetings have approved this approach. The
Corfu European Council in June 1994, instructed new negotia-
tions to achieve a free trade customs union with Turkey. 55 After
considerable efforts to obtain Greece's acquiescence finally suc-
ceeded, the Council agreed upon the customs union with Tur-
key in March 1995.356
The other two Mediterranean candidates are Cyprus and
Malta, which applied respectively on July 4 and 16, 1993.357 In
each case, the Commission provided a favorable opinion in June,
1993. However, the opinion on Malta cautioned that because
Malta has only 350,000 people, the mode of its participation in
Union institutions must be set in the 1996 intergovernmental
conference.3 5 8 With regard to Cyprus, although the Commission
concluded that it possessed "the kind of European identity that
suits it to membership" and has a stable and appropriate eco-
nomic status, the obvious stumbling block is the continued polit-
ical partition of the island 5 9 The Commission remarked that "a
peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the conflict" be-
tween the Greek majority and the Turkish minority must be
found before membership could be possible. 36° Given the con-
tinued presence of Turkish armed forces on Cyprus, separated
by a U.N. peace force and a no-man's land from the Greek Cy-
prus military, prospects for such a settlement might seem dim.
There has however, recently been some grounds for opti-
mism. The June 1994 Corfu European Council, under the
Greek presidency, specifically urged the Commission and Coun-
cil to undertake further efforts to prepare -for accession and
promised that "the next phase of enlargement of the Union will
gal, the Union's poorest member) and human rights issues, see Lansing & Bye, supra
note 252, at 69-70.
355. E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 14 (1994).
356. Lionel Barber, EU and Turkey Seal Customs Pact: Treaty Intended to Strengthen
Ankara's Role as NATO Member, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at 4.
357. 23 E.C. BULL., no. 7/8, at 98 (1990). Note that these two applications actually
came before those of Sweden, Finland and Norway.
358. 26 E.C. Bu., no. 6, at 100-01 (1993). On October 4, 1993, the Council
approved the Commission conclusions. 26 E.C. BULL, no. 10, at 69 (1993). Because
Cyprus has only 700,000 people,, its institutional representation may also pose a prob-
lem. See Booss & Forman, supra note 1, at 128; Lansing & Bye, supra note 252, at 70-72.
359. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 100 (1993).
360. Id. When the Council approved the Commission conclusions on October 4,
1993, it observed that if the continued efforts of the United Nations toward political
settlement should not bear fruit by January 1995, the subject should be reexamined.
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involve Cyprus and Malta."3 61 Moreover, in securing Greece's ac-
ceptance of the new customs union with Turkey, the Council has
promised that accession negotiations with Cyprus will open
within six months after the end of the 1996 Intergovernmental
Conference.3 6 2
If this time-table can be adhered to (which assumes at least
prior progress toward a firm settlement of the conflict between
Cypriot Greeks and Turks), then it is likely that negotiations for
accession will also be commenced with Malta and several central
European states. It would certainly seem more efficient to have
another large-scale enlargement than several piece-meal ones
over a period of time. It is of course possible, however, that
political or economic considerations will dictate an earlier acces-
sion for Cyprus, or Cyprus together with Malta, before the acces-
sion of any central European states, just as Greece's accession
preceded that of Portugal and Spain.
D. Institutional Issues Raised by Future Enlargement
Although it is conceivable that the European Union could
add one or two small states through minor tinkering with its
present institutional structure, any future large-scale enlarge-
ment would require major modifications. Because negotiations
with several countries (the four Visegrad states, together with Cy-
prus and Malta) are quite likely to begin in 1997 or 1998, and
another six or more states must be considered serious candidates
as well in the next few years, the Union must create an institu-
tional structure suitable for twenty-one, twenty-five or even
twenty-seven states.
Not only will efficiency in operations become a critical con-
cern, but the Union must heed the growing demands for in-
creased democratic legitimacy. Parliament's repealed requests
for a greater share in the legislative process can no longer, be
ignored (especially after the German Constitutional Court's em-
phasis on the need for further democratic evolution of the
Union in its Maastricht opinion),.63 As we have seen, Parlia-
ment's pressure to have democratic modifications occur prior to
the 1995 enlargement did not succeed. More recently, in a reso-
361. E.U. BuLL., no. 6, at 13 (1994).
362. See supra note 356.
363. See supra note 84.
1995] 1185
1186 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1092
lution of November 30, 1994, Parliament's endorsement of the
Commission's proposed strategy for central European enlarge-
ment was conditioned upon prior institutional revisions in the
1996 Intergovernmental Conference. 3" This time it is likely that
institutional modifications will be made, because both the Com-
mission and the Council, in their 1994 reports on a strategy for
further enlargement, agreed upon this, and the European Coun-
cil took the policy decision "that the institutional conditions for
ensuring the proper functioning of the Union must be created
at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference ... before accession
negotiations begin."3 65
At this point in time, the European Council has not yet
started to debate seriously the types of proposals that should be
considered at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, nor even
to frame its agenda. That will probably be done at a meeting
under the Spanish presidency later this year, although the June
Cannes European Council may start the process. We do not
even yet know the likely date for opening of the IGC, whether
early or late in 1996. But one can be confident that, because of
the sensitivity and difficulty of the issues, the IGC is apt to last at
least a year, until sometime in 1997.
Therefore, all that can be intelligently done at present is to
raise some of the key questions that will have to be addressed
and to speculate, with considerable caution, on possible modes
of approach to their answers.
Starting with the Council, the crucial question will not be
the number of weighted votes to be given new states, but how to
set the qualified majority vote - the thorny issue resulting in
the current Joanina Compromise. With the exception of Po-
land, none of the likely applicants have large populations, and
many have quite small ones - not only Cyprus and Malta, but
also Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia. The Council is likely to ac-
quire a number of members representing small or medium-sized
states that will each have a low number of weighted votes.
Because adding five to ten, or even more, smaller states
would create a risk that the five largest states (France, Germany,
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) would lose their present
majority of weighted votes, new solutions have to be considered.
364. E.U. BULL., no. 11, at 76 (1994).
365. Essen European Council Conclusions, supra note 352, at 12.
EUROPEAN UNION GROWS
One might be to increase the weighted votes of the four largest
to twenty, instead of ten, with perhaps fifteen weighted votes for
Spain, but with minor increases for medium-sized States (from
four or five votes to perhaps six to seven votes) and no increase
for the smaller States that have two or three weighted votes. An-
other more commonly offered proposal is to require a double
majority vote in the Council, setting a minimum population
threshold for the States voting in favor on any issue, in addition
to whatever qualified majority of weighted votes is set. However
complex the solution, it must be relatively efficient in practice,
and also relatively democratic, for the Council ultimately reflects
the people of the Union, even though less directly than does the
Parliament.
The number of issues on which the Council must act unani-
mously may well be reduced. As discussed previously, the more
Council members there are, the greater is the risk of veto or
deadlock provoked by the opposition of any one State. When so
many additional smaller States become Council members, the
veto power may no longer be acceptable.
Two major issues for both the European Council and the
Council will be how to rotate the presidency and what should be
the term of the presidency. One can speculate that in the future
the rotation system will make permanent the new policy of plac-
ing one of the five largest States in the presidency at frequent
intervals, at least once in every three terms and perhaps more
often. It may also be time to increase the term of the presidency
from six months to one year, enabling a greater degree of coher-
ence and stability in leadership. A shift to more than a one year
term, however, would seem not very likely, because it would
mean too long a rotation cycle.
That the Parliament's powers will be increased seems virtu-
ally certain. The co-decision, or Parliamentary veto procedure,
appears to be working efficiently, so that it is likely to be ex-
tended to additional fields. It is quite possible that Parliament
will also be given the right to initiate legislative proposals which
it has long sought. Whether Parliament will be given greater au-
thority in the designation of the Commission or the Court of
Justice remains to be seen. Parliament would like to be able to
vote on each individual nomination for Commissioner or judge,
which would give it a far greater influence over the composition
of both the Commission and the Court.
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Creating a ceiling for the total number of members of Par-
liament is certain to be a serious issue. It is arguable that with
624 members, Parliament is already too large to be very efficient.
Moreover, adding more offices, committee rooms, plenary halls,
staff and facilities for an even larger Parliament would create
such a significant budgetary burden that increasing its number
would seem doubtful. A ceiling at the present level of total
members would appear to be a more reasonable outcome.
Downsizing the Parliament may be raised at the 1996 Intergov-
ernmental Conference, but would seem less likely of acceptance.
The total size of the Commission is also certain to be a ma-
jor but sensitive issue. The principle that every State should have
one commissioner and that the large states should have two may
have to be sacrificed in order to preserve some degree of operat-
ing efficiency. A likely solution would be to replicate the present
mode of choosing advocates-general for the Court ofJustice: the
five larger states would each have a commissioner, and a group
of commissioners would rotate by lot among the other states.
The total Commission size might then be able to be reduced to
perhaps eleven to fifteen Commisioners, each with greater oper-
ational authority, thereby creating a more compact body for col-
legial decision-making.
Whether the authority of the President of the Commission
will be expressly increased, or remain the same, or even perhaps
be diminished in favor of increased authority of the Council
presidency is very much an open issue. President Jacques Delors
greatly increased the customary authority of the Commission
President, but whether the Member States will wish to formally
create any specific powers for the Commission President is open
to doubt.
Increasing the size of the Court ofJustice by adding ajudge
to represent each new state may pose less of an issue. As previ-
ously observed, because the Court can operate with increasing
use of chambers, it can conceivably even double in size. But cer-
tainly the larger the plenary Court, the less efficient it would be
in the resolution of the most important cases. Also, the Court's
composition should in some degree have a democratic character
- for example, should Germany and Malta each be entitled to
one judge? It may be time to rotate judges among smaller Mem-
ber States in a fashion analogous to the rotation of advocates-
general. On the other hand, it is perhaps hard to expect a Mem-
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ber State to feel comfortable when it happens to become the
subject of an Article 169 proceeding, or when an Article 177 ref-
erence has come from one of its courts, if there is no judge who
represents that State's legal tradition.
Finally, although not an institutional issue as such, there
must be serious consideration of the number of official and
working languages. While it is probably a constitutional impera-
tive that all legislation, international agreements and Court judg-
ments must be translated in every State's official language (s), ef-
ficiency and cost concerns are virtually certain to limit the
number of working languages for other purposes, as previously
discussed in section II(G).
CONCLUSION
The European Union is very much a dynamic concept with
an evolving, structure. As previously stressed, the Maastricht
Treaty on European Union did not represent the culmination of
a movement toward a completed federal union, but rather only
another step in the progressive evolution toward such a union.
The addition of Austria, Finland and Sweden as Member
States, the subject of this Article, necessarily required some sig-
nificant and not always easily understood modifications to the
institutional structure of the Union. This Article has endeavored
to depict clearly these changes and analyze some of the issues
behind them. The Article has also tried to describe concisely yet
adequately the procedural stages leading to the 1995 enlarge-
ment.
A major but often neglected Community (now Union) legal
and constitutional concept is the principle of the acquis com-
munautaire. The Article has traced its origin, its initial essential
meaning and the later expansion of the concept through succes-
sive enlargements, to its present status as a formal Maastricht
Treaty principle in Articles B and C. Debate over the extent of
the acquis communautaire principle and whether it need be ex-
panded, or even perhaps reduced, is bound to occur in future
enlargements.
The outset of this Article tried to situate the 1995 enlarge-
ment in the context of other major Community developments in
recent years, notably the single market program as a magnet for
outside states and the evolution of the Community into the Eu-
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ropean Union. Analogously, the final section has shifted the
theme to the future - what states may yet join the Union and
what institutional and other issues this might pose.
The 1995 enlargement represents a major addition to the
European Union. The future will tell us how significantly Aus-
tria, Finland and Sweden will be able to contribute to all aspects
of Union policy-making. The future will also reveal how the
Union will evolve to meet the challenge of further enlargements.
